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EMOTIONAL COMPETENCE, "RATIONAL UNDERSTANDING,"
AND THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT

Terry A. Maroney*
ABSTRACT

Adjudicative competence, more commonly referred to as competence to stand
trial, is a highly under-theorizedarea of law. Though it is well established that, to
be competent, a criminal defendant must have a "rational" as well as 'factual"
understandingof her situation, the meaning of such "rationalunderstanding" has
gone largely undefined. Given the large number of criminalprosecutionsin which
competence is at issue, the doctrine's instability stands in stark contrast to its
importance.
This Article argues that adjudicative competence, properly understood, asks
whether a criminaldefendant has capacity to participatemeaningfully in the host
of decisionspotentiallyrequiredof her Further,sound assessmentof such capacity
requires attention to both the cognitive and emotional influences on rational
decision-making in situationsof personal relevance and risk. The role of emotion
has been neglected, both in traditional accounts of decision-making and in
assessments of adjudicative competence, and merits particularattention. This
Article explores two examples of potentially competence-threatening emotional
dysfunction-severepsychiatricmood disorderand organic brain damage-either
of which may interfere unreasonablywith decision-relevantemotionalperception,
processing, and expression. Existing legal theory and forensic testing methods,
which reflect a predominantly cognitive approach,do not account adequatelyfor
such dysfunction. Shifting the adjudicative competence inquiry away from a
general searchfor "rationality" and towarda morefinely grained examination of
the cognitive and emotional influences on rational decision-making processes
offers our best hopefor giving meaning to "rationalunderstanding."

* Assistant Professor, Vanderbilt University Law School. The author is grateful to Oren Bar-Gill, Rachel
Barkow, Louis Charland, Barry Friedman, Ron Garet, David Garland, Thomas Grisso, Larry Heifer, Maggie
Lemos, Tom Lyon, John Monahan, Liam Murphy, Liz Phelps, Elyn Saks, Dan Simon, and Stephen Schulhofer for
thoughtful commentary. Thanks are due as well to Li-Ling Wang, Hazel Lord, and Deborah Paulus-Jagric for
excellent research assistance, and to New York University School of Law and the University of Southern
California Gould School of Law for sponsoring the fellowships during which this Article was developed. For Kim
Barry and Tim Maroney, ever present.
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INTRODUCTION

[Clognition is not as logical as it was once thought and emotions are not
always so illogical.1

The legal standard for adjudicative competence2 appears simple: as the Supreme
Court declared in Dusky v. United States, the test is whether a criminal defendant
"has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him." 3 This surface clarity, however,
disguises a fundamental lack of transparent meaning. A robust conception of
adjudicative competence that gives meaning to the Dusky standard must ask
whether a criminal defendant has the capacity to participate meaningfully in the
host of decisions potentially required of her, and sound assessment of such
capacity requires careful attention to both the cognitive and emotional influences
on rational decision-making. To date, no such theory of Dusky rationality has been
adequately articulated, and implementation of the adjudicative competence construct is commensurately unstable. A decision-making approach, one that overtly
concerns itself with both emotion and cognition, offers a path to both legitimate
and stabilize a confused area of criminal law.
Adjudicative competence is, in many respects, the neglected younger sibling of
the insanity defense, a secondary status that may explain its instability and
relatively low profile. Its jurisprudence has grown up in insanity's shadow, to the
extent that it until recently was referred to as "present insanity."'4 Indeed, in the
execution context the language of insanity and competence continues to be
confusingly intertwined.5 Forensic experts often undertake to examine both
competence and legal insanity at the same time and-unfortunately-by the same

1. JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYsTERuous UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE 35 (1996).
ET AL., ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE: THE MACARTHUR STUDIES 40 (2002)
2. See NORMAN G. PoYTHREss

(defining "adjudicative competence" as the ability of the defendant to "understand[] his jeopardy and... to advise
the lawyer who is representing him"); THE MACARTHUR ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE STUDY, ExECUrIVE
SUMMARY, http://macarthur.virginia.edu/adjudicate.html (2001) [hereinafter MACARTHUR STUDY, ExECuTrvE
SUMMARY] ("'[Aidjudicative competence"' is a "more appropriate term than 'competence to stand trial,' given

that approximately 90 percent of all criminal cases in the United States are resolved by means of guilty pleas,
rather than at trial.").
3. 362 U.S. 402,402 (1960) (per curiam).
4. See, e.g., Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 357-60 nn.8-14 (1996); see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S.
389, 405-06 (1993). The intertwining of insanity and competence has its origins in Blackstone and Hale, who
conceived incompetence as a form of "madness" likely distinguished from legal insanity only by reason of
afflicting a defendant after his offense but before trial, sentence, or execution. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4
COMMENTARIES *24; MATHEw HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34-35 (1736).
5. See generally Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (using insanity and competency interchangeably);
cf. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-5.6(b) (1989) (discussing the problems with using
insanity and incompetency interchangeably).
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criteria, generally that of insanity; courts historically have done little better.6 The
two doctrines also meet with the same generally disdainful attitude, as incompetence, like insanity, appears to many to be a mechanism by which perpetrators of
criminal acts can escape accountability. 7 But legal insanity and adjudicative
competence are importantly distinct: the former looks to whether a person is able
to understand the nature and quality of her acts, so as to justify attachment of
criminal consequences, while the latter looks to whether a defendant is possessed
of sufficient capacity to defend her own interests within the various stages of an
ensuing prosecution. 8
Though the insanity defense claims the lion's share of attention, adjudicative
competence is far more important. Certainly, it has a much deeper reach into the
defendant population. Indeed, one commentator has asserted that "[v]irtually
every criminal defendant who appears to be mentally ill at any time within the
criminal trial process is examined for competency," 9 as compared with the
extremely small number of defendants who mount an insanity defense.'o Actual or
suspected adjudicative incompetence affects a consistently significant percentage

6. RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN L. GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 16,51 (1980); see Bruce J. Winick,
Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REv. 921, 982 (1985) ("Clinicians, particularly
psychiatrists, historically have misunderstood the legal issues involved with incompetency, frequently confusing
it with legal insanity or with the clinical definition of psychosis.").
7. See, e.g., United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1999) (recounting multiple competency
determinations in case against Vinny "Chin" Gigante). Gigante, who was widely believed to be malingering,
inspired a storyline in The Sopranos in which Uncle Junior feigns incompetence (but later develops symptoms of
incompetence). See The Sopranos: Whoever Did This (HBO television broadcast Nov. 10, 2002), http://
www.hbo.com/sopranos/episode/season4/episode48.shtml.
8. See, e.g., Godinez, 509 U.S. at 403 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that legal standards attending insanity
and competence are procedurally and substantively distinct); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 739 (1972)
(distinguishing insanity and incompetence). Persons are presumed to be both competent at the time of criminal
proceedings and sane at the time of the offense, but may be found both incompetent and insane (presumably in a
forensic inquiry before trial, for incompetence will bar trial); competent and insane (which must be the case
whenever a defendant goes to trial but prevails on the insanity defense); or incompetent and sane (in which case
we attempt to restore competence so imposition of criminal consequences may be determined on the merits).
Conflating the two inquiries creates potential for serious injustice, for example, by subjecting the incompetent but
sane person to trial because she understands right from wrong, despite the fact that she is not in a position
adequately to protect her own interests. See Cooper, 517 U.S. at 364 (stating that the consequences of being tried
while incompetent are "dire").
9. Winick, supra note 6, at 924.
10. 'The insanity defense is raised in only about 1% of felony cases in the United States, and although success
rates vary widely across jurisdictions, it is successful only in 26% of the cases where it is raised." David R. Kamer,
Raising MentalHealth Issues-Other than Insanity-In Juvenile DelinquencyDefense, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 73, 73 n. 1
(2000) (quoting Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, The Treatment of Mentally DisorderedOffenders, 3 PsYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 126, 127 (1997)). See generally Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristicsof
Insanity Defense Pleas: An Eight State Study, 19 BULL. AM. AcAD.PSYcHIATRY & L. 331 (1991) (citing similar
data regarding percentages of the usage and success of the insanity defense); Eric Silver et al., Demythologizing
InaccuratePerceptions of the Insanity Defense, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.63 (1994) (comparing public perceptions
on the usage of the insanity defense to the actual usage of the defense).

1378

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1375

of misdemeanor and felony defendants:"' it is implicated in as many of 8% of
cases, t 2 accounts for tens of thousands of forensic examinations and admissions to
inpatient medical facilities every year,' 3 and easily is the most common subject of
mental health testimony in criminal cases. 14 The consequences of an incompetence
adjudication are, from a defendant's perspective, grave: such a finding may well
translate into long-term confinement, particularly for those defendants deemed
dangerous to themselves or others, without opportunity for a finding of guilt or
innocence. 15
Indeed, among inpatients with criminal-justice-system involvement, those with
questioned competence or who have been adjudicated incompetent far outnumber
those for whom insanity at the time of the offense is the issue-perhaps by a
margin as great as 100 to 1.16
Despite the evident importance of adjudicative competence, and despite its solid
historical pedigree, 1 7 it remains a surprisingly neglected and ill-defined area of
law.' 8 This is despite the fact that the governing legal standards appear straightfor11. A surprisingly large number of defendants accused of low-level crimes are referred for competence
evaluation, despite the relatively lenient possible punishment as compared to the potentially long-term nature of
an incompetence commitment, whether for evaluation, treatment, or both. See ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6,
at 56 (stating 30% of the committed defendants in 1978 study were charged with disturbing the peace); Robert A.
Burt & Norval Morris, A Proposalfor Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. CHI.L. REv. 66, 79 n.54 (1972)
(referring to a 1950s-era study that indicated that within the questioned-competence population accused
misdemeanants far outnumbered felons). But see ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 52-53 (reporting finding
from a 1975 study that those accused of violent interpersonal crimes were disproportionately represented in the
"incompetent population").
12. See PoYTHREss Er AL., supra note 2, at 9 (claiming 8.2% are referred); Patricia A. Zapf & Ronald Roesch,
Mental Competency Evaluations:Guidelinesfor Judges and Attorneys, COURT REV. Summer 2000, at 28 (stating
that between 2 and 8% of felony defendants are referred). But see Winick, supra note 6, at 928 n.21 (discussing a
1973 study of Manhattan cases which showed 0.87% of defendants referred).
13. See THOMAS GRisso, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS 69 (2d ed.
2003) (estimating 25,000 competency evaluations annually in the 1980s in the United States); Patricia A. Zapf &
Jodi L. Viljoen, Issues and ConsiderationsRegarding the Use of Assessment Instruments in the Evaluation of
Competency to Stand Trial, 21 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 351, 352 (2003) (discussing a recent estimate of 60,000
evaluations each year); Zapf & Roesch, supranote 12, at 28 (estimating between 25,000 and 39,000 evaluations
in United States annually).
14. "In 1994, the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards noted that 'the issue of
present mental incompetence, quantitatively speaking, is the single most important issue in the criminal mental
health field."' MAcARTHUR STUDY, ExEcutrvE SUMMARY, supra note 2.
15. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 719 (1972).
16. Winick, supra note 6, at 923 n.3; see also Burt & Morris, supra note 11, at 66 n. 1 (discussing a 1967 study
that found over half of criminal offenders in surveyed hospitals were admitted for incompetence while insanity
acquittees accounted for 4%) (citing P. SCHEIDEMANDEL & C. KANNO, THE MENTALLY ILL OFFENDER 20 (1969)).
17. E.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992) ("The rule that a criminal defendant who is
incompetent should not be required to stand trial has deep roots in our common-law heritage."); Cooper, 517 U.S.
at 356-357 (citing King v. Frith, (1790) 22 How. St. Tr. 307, 311, Queen v. Goode, (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 572
(K.B.), and King v. Pritchard, (1836) 173 Eng. Rep. 135); Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937 (6th Cir. 1899);
United States v. Lawrence, 26 F. Cas. 887 (D.C. Cir. 1835); Guagando v. State, 41 Tex. 626 (Tex. 1874); Freeman
v. People, 4 Denio 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847).
18. See Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of CriminalDefendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 539, 540-41 (1993) (arguing that there exists little research on the meaning of incompetence and that case
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ward. The law is clear, for example, that a criminal defendant has a fundamental
constitutional right not to be tried, convicted, sentenced, or executed while
incompetent. 1 9 The substantive meaning of "incompetence" might appear similarly clear, but in fact is theoretically slippery. 20 The meaning of each term
embedded within the Dusky standard-notably the distinction between a "rational" and a "factual" understanding-has escaped significant elaboration by courts
and theorists. 2 1 It is also highly unpredictable in application, in large part because
the task of implementing Dusky generally falls to forensic experts, to whom courts
defer heavily but to whom firm guidance as to the legal standard is seldom given.
These experts-typically psychologists and psychiatrists, but sometimes specialists in other areas of medicine and the mind sciences23-may differ wildly in
approach, theoretical framework, understanding of the relevant legal constructs,
and conclusions. Factually similar cases therefore may meet different outcomes;
indeed, it is common for different experts to reach diametrically opposed conclu-

law fails to define the meaning of competence). This neglect is most pronounced in the academic legal literature;
the forensic literature is significantly more developed. See, e.g., RICHARD 1. FREDERICK ET AL., EXAMINATIONS OF
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL: FOUNDATIONS IN MENTAL HEALTH CASE LAW (2004); GRISSO, supra note 13;
POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2.

19. See e.g., Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975); Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). While the Court has left open a small window for experimentation with
innocence-only adjudications of the incompetent, see Jackson, 406 U.S. at 740-41 (mentioning statutes in certain
states that permit incompetent defendants to have a trial to determine their innocence, but where a finding of guilty
will not be entered against them), that invitation has not been answered. Further, a different substantive standard
of "competence" applies in the execution context. See generally Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,410-11 (1986)
(setting forth standard for competence to be executed); see also note 52, infra.
20. See Zapf& Roesch, supranote 12, at 28 ("Although the concept of competency to stand trial has been long
established in law, its definition, as exemplified by the ambiguities of Dusky, has never been explicit.").
21. See id. (arguing that crucial phrases within the Dusky standard are ill defined); see also United States v.
Housh, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1229 (D. Kan. 2000) (arguing that few cases "have given meaning to the 'rational
understanding' phraseology used by the Dusky court").
The "rational understanding" test appears in both the "communication with counsel" and "understanding of the
proceedings" prongs of the Dusky standard. There would appear to be no meaningful distinction between the
terms as used in these two prongs; further, courts seldom address them separately. One sense in which the first
requirement might be independently significant is where a rational defendant lacks mechanical ability to
communicate. Cf. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 718 (discussing the defendant's inability to communicate and lack of
hearing as components of his incompetence). The type of irrationality about which Dusky is primarily concerned,
though, is a rational decision-making deficit, which might affect both understanding of the proceedings and
ability to communicate with counsel. See infra Part I.B.
22. See, e.g., Medina, 505 U.S. at 465 ("Competency determinations by and large turn on the testimony of
psychiatric experts, not lawyers.") (citing study showing rates of judicial agreement with experts' recommendations "typically exceeding 90%"); Grant H. Morris et al., Competency to Stand Trial on Trial, 4 Hous. J. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 193, 199-200 & nn.28-30 (2004) (citing several studies indicating 90-100% rate of agreement by
judges with an expert's assessment of competency); Zapf & Viljoen, supra note 13, at 352, 364 (showing
agreement rates of almost 100%, though "the typical forensic evaluation is left largely unguided").
23. See Winick, supra note 6 at 930 & nn.29-30 (arguing historical reliance on psychiatrists is giving way to
increasing reliance on psychologists, social workers, and examiners from other disciplines); see also LEDoux,
supra note 1, at 38-39 (defining "mind sciences").
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sions in the same case.24 Forensic experts and legal theorists have collaborated,
particularly in very recent years, to formulate standardized mechanisms for
defining and measuring competence-relevant facts, but these tests are not25 yet
widely used, despite their promise of promoting some measure of uniformity.
In short, adjudicative competence, despite its enormous importance, is on whole
a surprisingly ramshackle affair.26 It is poorly understood, under-theorized, and
inconsistently implemented.
This Article proposes that a coherent theory and practice of adjudicative
competence requires a robustly articulated concept of the baseline rationality we
expect of criminal defendants. The first step in such an articulation is recognition
that the Dusky standard embraces a requirement of "decisional competence," that
is, the ability to make, communicate, and implement minimally rational and
self-protective choices within the unique context of the criminal case. 27 The
crucial, yet to date entirely unexplored, next step is to recognize that both
cognition and emotion-colloquially, thinking and feeling-make important contributions to such rational decision-making capacity. The role of emotion in
adjudicative competence therefore is the primary focus of this Article.
Part L.A situates adjudicative competence within a family of law-relevant
competencies and briefly outlines the decision points at which it may affect any
given criminal proceeding. Part I.B demonstrates that decisional competence is
inherent in the "rational understanding" component of the Dusky standard. Part I.C
then articulates the necessary components of the rational decision-making on
which a criminal defendant's decisional competence depends. Drawing on certain
courts' analysis of the disruptive effects of psychotic thought disorder, this Section
models how an appropriately fine-grained analysis of competence will seek to
articulate precisely where in the decision-making process the defendant has gone
astray and explain why those defects implicate her ability to represent her own
interests within a criminal proceeding.
Part II then argues that the role of emotion is wrongly neglected in the traditional
account of decision-making, including its application to adjudicative competence,
and that attention to emotion's role illuminates certain threats to competence that
are not perceptible with a solely cognitive view. The historical privileging of
cognition within adjudicative competence mirrors the traditional, if of late largely
discredited, disparagement and neglect of emotion within both law and the mind

24. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1992) (explaining that four experts expressed a range
of opinions and conclusions); Morris et al., supranote 22, at 215-16 (estimating that psychiatrists would agree on
the outcome of a Dusky standard evaluation at most 80% of the time).
25. See generally PoYTHRss ET AL., supra note 2; see also Grisso, supra note 13, at 80-81 (explaining how
researchers have attempted to standardize evaluation mechanisms).
26. See Winick, supra note 6, at 922 (arguing that adjudicative competency has a "status in the criminal mental

health system that is perhaps the most frequently misunderstood by attorneys, judges, and mental health
professionals, as well as by the public").
27. The term was coined by Richard J. Bonnie. Bonnie, supra note 18, at 567; see also infra Part I.B.
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sciences. Part II.A therefore calls special attention to emotion's role in decisionmaking. Part II.B then explores two illustrative contexts in which a focus on
emotion will yield results that a cognitive inquiry likely will not: cases in which a
defendant suffers from a severe psychiatric mood disorder or from organic brain
damage, where such condition unreasonably interferes with decision-relevant
emotional perception, processing, and expression. Existing legal theory and
forensic testing methods do not account explicitly for competence-relevant emotional dysfunction, and a predominantly cognitive approach is likely to miss or
discount its impact.
Part III addresses weighty issues of implementation and policy, asking how a
focus on the thinking-and-feeling elements of rational decision-making might be
applied and whether such an application would further the goals of the adjudicative
competence doctrine without unduly threatening other valuable societal goals.
This Part argues that the transparency benefits of this approach are substantial and,
further, that it could be implemented with an acceptable level of reliability and
consistency. Part III proposes further that while this approach may generate
tensions with other social goods-such as promoting defendant autonomy and
protecting public safety-it will not add appreciably to those tensions already
attending the adjudicative competence inquiry.
This Article concludes that a proper view of the Dusky standard requires that,
when judging whether a defendant is competent to decide for herself how to
navigate the shoals of criminal prosecution, we look to both her thought processes
and emotional functioning.
I. "RATIONAL UNDERSTANDING" AND RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING

Adjudicative competence doctrine, like all law-relevant competencies, traditionally has sought to balance competing interests. On the side of finding competence
wherever possible are respect for a defendant's autonomy and the state's interest in
enforcing its criminal law; the countervailing interest is, fundamentally, that of
protecting those who cannot protect themselves. 28 Significantly, the common-law
doctrine of competence is thought to have developed "'as a by-product of the ban
against trials in absentia; the mentally incompetent defendant, though physically
present in the courtroom, is in reality afforded no opportunity to defend himself."' 29 Prosecution of an incompetent defendant is thought to be an unfair fight of
the worst kind, one that threatens grave harm to the individual, endangers
reliability of outcome, and erodes the dignity of the process. Adjudicative

28. See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 457 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Due
Process Clause prevents trying a person who is incompetent); Bonnie, supra note 18, at 551-53 (arguing that a
defendant who does not understand the nature of the criminal proceedings cannot be tried).
29. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (quoting Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-TrialCommitment
of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 832, 834 (1960)).
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competence thus is "fundamental to an adversary system of justice. ' 30 For the
adversary system to have legitimacy, the defendant must be meaningfully present
as an autonomous actor capable of taking, should she so choose, permissible steps
to attempt to protect herself from the assertion of state power.
Adjudicative competence therefore may be implicated at any stage in a criminal
proceeding at which it appears that the defendant may lack such self-protective
capacity, and-as the following Sections demonstrate-at each such juncture the
operative inquiry is whether she is capable of making rational decisions in service
of her defense. While this focus on "decisional competence" has not been
explicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court, it is implicit in the case law; indeed, it is
hard to imagine a viable concept of competence that excludes it. Accepting a role
for decisional competence requires a theory as to the necessary components of
rational decision-making with reference to the particular decisions facing criminal
defendants. 3 t This Part undertakes an articulation of those components and, using
examples from certain cases involving psychotic defendants, demonstrates how
such an approach promotes accuracy and transparency in competence determinations.
A. Introduction to Adjudicative Competence
Adjudicative competence is but one in a family of legal competency constructs
that includes capacity to consent to or refuse medical care and research, enter into a
contract, execute a will, and handle one's own property and finances.32 Some legal
(in)competencies are status-based-for example, the law categorically deems
children unable to make any number of decisions on their own behalf-but the
majority are individually-determined departures from a baseline assumption of
33
autonomy.
Three common threads tie all law-relevant competencies together. First, competence is best understood as (to borrow a term familiar to the sciences but relatively
foreign to law) an open-textured construct, the meaning of which "can never be

30. Id. at 171-72; see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 364 (1996) (concluding that a correct
determination of competence is fundamental to the fairness of a trial). The adversarial nature of the adjudicative
competence construct is perhaps what most distinguishes it from other law-relevant competencies, particularly
capacity to consent to medical treatment.
31. See Bonnie, supra note 18, at 548 ('The greatest need for theoretical development arises in relation to
decisional competence."); see also id. at 571 (noting that "case law on decisional competence in criminal
adjudication" is "skimpy").
32. GRisso, supra note 13, at 7. Competence to consent to and refuse medical treatment is perhaps the most
explored of these. See generally THOMAS GRisso & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE TO CONSENT TO

TREATMENT (1998) (discussing competence generally and how it relates to consent to and refusal of medical
treatment).
33. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Ought We to Require Emotional Capacity as Part of Decisional Competence?, 8 KENNEDY INST. OF ETmcs J. 377, 378 (1999) ("Contemporary ideas of competence are tied inextricably
to the ideal of self-determination in modem Western societies.").
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fully reduced to a set of concrete operations and observationaltens. ' ' 3 4 Because
competence "is an abstraction" that "retains the elusive quality of an idea," law
provides "broad discretion in determining whether a set of case facts satisfies the
criteria., 35 Second, connecting all legal competencies is the recognition that "some
individuals may not have the capacities to make important decisions in their lives"
and that these "incapacities may jeopardize their welfare or that of others."3 6 Law
therefore provides a mechanism for identifying such individuals and in such cases
authorizes (and sometimes obligates) the state to curtail their rights. Courts make
these decisions with deliberately heavy reliance on mental health professionals.37
Third, because determinations of legal incompetence are by nature profoundly
paternalistic, 38 the objective is not to ensure that an individual has the highest
possible level of decision-making capacity, but rather to avoid state intervention if
she has the bare minimum required.39
Moreover, the relevant decision-making capacity is utterly context-dependent;
"[n]o single legal criterion or test applies across all legal competencies," and the
law does not presume that (in)competence in one arena will imply or affect
(in)competence in another.40 The consequence of incompetence also will vary: in
some situations, such as inability to handle one's financial affairs, surrogate
decision-making may be permitted; in others, the subject will be unable to access a
good, such as dangerous medical treatment to which she is incompetent to consent;
and in others, such as inability to provide for the basics of one's survival, the
person may be institutionalized.
As part of the universe of legal competencies, adjudicative competence, broadly
defined, includes competence to waive Miranda rights; plead guilty; dismiss
counsel; stand trial and make the various decisions required during trial; pursue or
abandon appeals and other avenues for post-conviction relief; and be executed.'a

34. ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 12-13 (stating that "no absolute set of facts is ever dispositive of
competency," though the "'rationally consult, assist, and comprehend' standard of Dusky (and the surrounding
cases) is an attempt, albeit rather vague, to set forth the theoretical terms of the competency construct").
35. GRISSO, supra note 13, at 22.
36. Id. at 2.
37. See id. (explaining the long history of relying on mental health professionals for assessment of "human
abilities, emotions, and potentials").
38. See, e.g., Elyn R. Saks & Stephen H. Behnke, Competency to Decide on Treatment and Research:
MacArthur and Beyond, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUEs 103, 104 (1999) ("[T]he tension between autonomy and
paternalism remains central to the assessment of competency.").
39. Burt & Morris, supra note 11, at 85; see also Appelbaum, supra note 33, at 378 (arguing that the standards
of competence should be such that only a small number of people are not "permitted to make decisions on their
own").
40. GRISSO, supra note 13, at 9; see Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 183 (2003) (noting that a defendant
may be incompetent to be tried but competent to refuse medical treatment).
41. GRISSO, supra note 13, at 3. Because Mirandacompetence and the competence of juveniles both are the
subject of an extensive and generally separate jurisprudence, neither is addressed in this Article. However, some
of the arguments herein may well apply with equal force to juveniles. See, e.g., MENTAL HEALTH SCREENING AND

AssEssMENT INJUVENILE JUSTICE 357 (Thomas Grisso et al. eds., 2005) (discussing juveniles' ability to appreciate
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Within any given criminal case, then, the issue of competence may be raised at
multiple junctures." After a defendant is arrested and charged, any party (or the
trial judge) may raise the issue of possible incompetence. The court will then
determine whether there is a bona fide doubt as to competence. 4 3 If not, the case
proceeds (though the process may well begin again if incompetence is argued at a
later point). If so, the court will order an inquiry in conformance with the law of the
jurisdiction, which will almost certainly entail examination by a mental health
professional (and likely more than one) in an inpatient or outpatient setting. A
clinical expert (or experts) will likely submit a written report and testify at a
hearing, and probably will proffer a recommendation as to the ultimate issue of
legal competence. 44 The trial court is overwhelmingly likely to agree with the
expert recommendation.4 5 If multiple experts give differing testimony, the court is
likely to side with the prosecution's expert, as the burden of proof as to
incompetence generally will rest with the defendant.46
If the defendant is found competent, the trial will continue (again, with the same
caveat as to new evidence of incompetence, which may take the form of
increasingly erratic behavior at trial). If, however, the defendant is found incompetent, she will be subjected to a period of continued evaluation and treatmentpotentially including involuntary medication should certain stringent requirements
be met47-in accordance with jurisdiction-specific timelines, bounded by an
outside requirement of "reasonableness. '4 8 Should competence at any point be
restored, proceedings will resume; but should the defendant be deemed unlikely to
their Mirandarights); Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles'Competenceto Stand Trial:A Comparison ofAdolescents'
and Adults' Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 333 (2003) (evaluating a study comparing
competence in juveniles with that of adults).
42. See RoEscH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 131-38 & Figure 5-1 (outlining the potential junctures requiring
determinations of defendant competency and including a graphical rendering of this process).
43. See, e.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 178-81 (1975) (determining that the evidence presented created
a sufficient doubt of the defendant's competence and requiring further inquiry by the lower court); Pate v.
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378-86 (1966) (holding that the evidence presented raised a sufficient doubt as to the
defendant's competence such that he was deprived of due process when the trial court failed to give him an
adequate hearing).
44. See Bonnie, supra note 18, at 550 ("[Jludges practically insist on ultimate issue opinion in reports and
testimony on competence to stand trial."); RoEscH & GOLDING, supranote 6, at 18 (stating that experts "typically
testify in conclusory terms, often parroting the statutory language"). There is a substantial debate as to whether a
competence examiner ever should proffer an opinion as to the ultimate issue of adjudicative incompetence. See
generally Christopher Slobogin, The "Ultimate Issue" Issue, 7 BEHAv. Sc. & L. 259 (1989).
45. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (explaining that agreement rates are near 100%).
46. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 451-52 (1992) (holding that a state may place the burden on a
defendant to show incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence); cf. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348,
355-56 (1996) (holding that a state may not impose a clear and convincing evidence burden on a defendant).
47. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992);
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990).
48. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that it is unconstitutional to confine the
defendant indefinitely solely on the basis of adjudicative incompetence; confinement may continue only for a
reasonable period to determine likelihood of competence restoration and be justified by progress toward that
goal).
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be restored to competence within a "reasonable" time, she must be released or civil
commitment proceedings must commence. 49 During a period of indeterminate
incompetence it is not clear whether the criminal charges may remain pending, or
for how long.5 °
Finally, should a competent defendant be sentenced to death, she may face
further inquiry should she decide to waive all appeals, 5' and may have a claim of
incompetence to be executed if she has experienced a substantial decline in mental
health while incarcerated.52
Unfortunately, the substantive meaning of the competency construct underlying
this straightforward procedure remains relatively undeveloped. But one strong
theme that emerges from the cases, albeit largely sub rosa, is that--consistent with
competence inquiries generally-the primary concern should be whether the
defendant is capable of making critical decisions. As the following Section
demonstrates, such decisional competence is an integral component of the Dusky
standard.5 3
B. Decisional Competence as a Component ofAdjudicative Competence
The roots of the decisional competence construct may be found in the "rational
understanding" component of Dusky itself.54 In Dusky the Court was faced with a
defendant who, according to medical experts, suffered from schizophrenia but
"understood what he was charged with, knew that if there was a trial it would be
before a judge and jury, knew that if found guilty he could be punished,. . . knew
who his attorney was and that it was his duty to protect the defendant's rights," and
49. Id. Many or most adjudicatively incompetent defendants can likely be shown to be dangerous to
themselves or others, subjecting them in most jurisdictions to civil commitment. Some commentators have
complained that Jackson has not prevented permanent commitment for the adjudicatively incompetent, but
merely has shifted the mechanism. See Winick, supra note 6, at 927 & n.17, 940-41 & nn.73-79.
50. This question was left unanswered by Jackson. See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 740 (declining to reach question
of whether due process prohibits "holding pending criminal charges indefinitely over the head of one who will
never have a chance to prove his innocence").
51. See Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 313-14 (1966) (per curiam).
52. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). The standard for competence to be executed is a relatively
minimal one, looking to whether the prisoner has "the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death
penalty and the reasons why it was imposed on him." Id. at 403-04 (quoting FL. STAT. § 922.07 (1985)). This is
generally interpreted to require only a showing that those to be executed "know the fact of their impending
execution and the reason for it." Id. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring). If this is the correct standard, competence to be
executed likely requires little or none of the decision-making capacity discussed with regard to adjudicative
competence in infra Part I.B. However, such capacity might be relevant were a more expansive notion of
competence to be executed to be adopted. See, e.g., id. at 414-15 (appearing to regard as relevant whether a
condemned inmate can confer with counsel and contribute to an assessment of the fairness and accuracy of the
sentence); SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFMR, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND

MATERIALS 877-78 (7th ed. 2001) (comparing the instances of some states following and modifying the standards
set forth in Ford); ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-5.6(b) (1989) (defining when an inmate

is incompetent to be executed).
53. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
54. See id.
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could furnish at least some relevant historical information with substantial accuracy.55 His incompetence, they testified, stemmed not from his inability to grasp
factual concepts but, rather, from the "confused thinking" caused by his mental
illness, which they asserted had rendered him unable to "interpret reality from
unreality."'56 Nonetheless, the district court found Dusky competent to proceed to
trial.57
In a brief per curiam opinion, the Court accepted verbatim the Solicitor
General's proposed definition of competence:
[Ilt is not enough for the district judge to find that "the defendant [is] oriented
to time and place and [has] some recollection of events".. . the "test must be
whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he 58
has a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."
Thus, the factual understanding displayed by Dusky was necessary but not
sufficient for competence. What was also required was some sort of rational
understanding, which, though apparently crucial, remained undefined.
Subsequent cases attempting to define what evidence would raise a bona fide
doubt as to Dusky incompetence have yielded some additional hints as to what
types of irrationality might be relevant. The Court, while resisting any attempt to
define "a general standard" for such evidence,5 9 has delineated certain facts that
generally warrant further inquiry-such as a "history of pronounced irrational
behavior ' '6° or a recent suicide attemptt-and others that are insufficient to
foreclose the inquiry even if relevant to the ultimate determination-such as lucid
speech and behavior in the courtroom.6 2 Despite these clues, the value added by a
requirement of "rational" as well as "factual" understanding has remained unclear.

55. Dusky v. United States, 271 F.2d 385, 388, 389-92 (8th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
56. Id. at 389.
57. Id. at 389-90.
58. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402 (quoting the Solicitor General's brief). The experts defined "orient[ation] to time,
place, and person" thus:
This means that he is able to know the day of the week, the hour, the place in which he finds
himself geographically, and the circumstances of his present situation. He knows he is in a
courtroom; he knows the day of the week and the day of the year, and he knows that you are his
attorney and Judge Smith is the judge.
Dusky, 271 F.2d at 389. Though Dusky pertained only to the proper interpretation of the federal competence
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (2006), some version of the Dusky test now has been adopted in virtually every
jurisdiction. See Winick, supra note 6, at 923 n.4; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.04 (1962).
59. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975).

60. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1966).
61. Drope, 420 U.S. at 179.

62. See Pate, 383 U.S. at 385-86 (holding that the defendant's alertness at trial was not in and of itself enough
to conclude that the defendant was competent).
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That situation changed somewhat with Godinez v. Moran,63 in which the Court
read a decision-making focus into the standard for Dusky rationality. Godinez
answered a brewing debate among the lower courts and commentators as to
whether different substantive standards of competency applied to different aspects,
or at different stages, of a criminal proceeding. 64 The short answer, the Court held,
was no.
Richard Allen Moran, charged with killing the owner and a patron of a bar as
well as his former wife, was found competent not only to stand trial but also to
waive his rights to an attorney and trial; after a colloquy, the trial court accepted his
waiver of counsel and plea; and he was convicted and sentenced to death.65 Moran
later argued that he had been "mentally incompetent to represent himself.' '66 The
Ninth Circuit agreed, reasoning that while Moran might have been Duskycompetent for purposes of standing trial with counsel, he should have been found
competent to waive counsel and plead guilty only if determined also to have "the
capacity for 'reasoned choice' among the alternatives available to him.",6 7 The
Ninth Circuit interpreted such capacity for "reasoned choice" as articulating a
different (and more stringent) standard than that outlined in Dusky.68
The Court rejected the notion that there was a substantive difference between
"reasoned choice" and "rational understanding. ' 69 Listing the wide array of
choices required of defendants whether they go to trial or plead guilty, the Court
held that the same standard applied to both universes of decision-making. 70 The
only sense in which a higher standard applied is that certain decisions-such as
those made by Moran to discharge counsel and plead guilty-additionally require
a separate determination that they were made knowingly, intelligently, and

63. 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
64. The chief proponent of a "Dusky-plus" standard for certain critical decisions was Bonnie. See Bonnie,
supra note 18.
65. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 392-93.
66. Id. at 393.
67. Id. at 394. This "reasoned choice" standard was drawn from Rees v. Peyton, in which the Court held that a
death-row inmate was competent to waive appeals only if he were shown to have "capacity to appreciate his
position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other
hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity
in the premises." 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966) (per curiam); see also Godinez, 509 U.S. at 415 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("The standard applied by the Ninth Circuit in this case-the 'reasoned choice' standard-closely
approximates the 'rational choice' standard set forth in Rees.").
68. Similarly, Bonnie had argued that decision-making capacity was not required in every case. Rather, he
explicitly "unhingefed] decisional competence from the Dusky formula," with the former coming into play only
after Dusky competence is established and certain decisions are faced by the defendant. Bonnie, supra note 18, at

577-600.
69. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 397-98 (finding that how the standards might differ "is not readily apparent," and
noting that even respondent argued that the distinction was "merely one of 'terminology"'); id. at 407 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (pointing to "the lack of any clear distinction between a 'rational understanding' and a 'reasoned

choice' in this case").
70. Id. at 398-400.
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voluntarily. 7 1 In the end, the Court appeared to regard the dispute as one of
semantics, as it believed capacity for "reasoned choice" or "rational choice" to
mean nothing other than a "rational understanding" in the Dusky sense. 72
Decided more than three decades after Dusky, Godinez represents the Court's
most specific effort to explain what "rational understanding" might mean. 73 The
effort is in one sense frustratingly opaque: after Godinez, "rational understanding"
likely means what the Ninth Circuit meant when it spoke of capacity for "reasoned
choice," though it might mean something slightly different and somehow less
demanding. 74 What is clear, though, is the Court's focus on defendant decisionmaking as the crucial capacity to which the rationality aspect of the competence
construct is directed.
To be sure, Godinez did not use the term "decisional competence," urged on it
by prominent commentators, 75 or make absolutely explicit that Dusky's "rational
understanding" standard was meant to embrace such a concept. Indeed, the
dissenters complained bitterly that the majority had imposed an unduly passive
notion of Dusky competence on very consequential decisions. 76 Some therefore
have interpreted Godinez "to mean that defendants' decision making abilities need
not be considered when making judgments about their competence, because the
Dusky standard makes no specific reference to 'decision making.' 77 But this
conclusion is belied by the Godinez majority's nearly single-minded focus on the
various decisions that might be required of a criminal defendant.7 8 Indeed, the
Court asserted that
all criminal defendants-not merely those who plead guilty-may be required
to make important decisions once criminal proceedings have been initiated.

71. Id. at 400-02 (citing, inter alia, Westbrook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 (1966) (per curiam), and Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (holding that the defendant has a
right to defend himself as long as he decides to do so voluntarily and intelligently). As the Godinez Court clarified:
The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant's mental capacity; the question is whether he
has the ability to understand the proceedings ....The purpose of the "knowing and voluntary"
inquiry, by contrast, is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced.
509 U.S. at 401 n. 12. "In this sense," then, "there is a 'heightened' standard for pleading guilty and for waiving the
right to counsel, but it is not a heightened standard of competence." Id. at 401.
72. Id. at 397-98.
73. See Bonnie, supra note 18, at 593 (noting that before Godinez, the Court had "not had the occasion to
elaborate further on the substantive aspects of the competence doctrine").
74. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 397-98 (holding that, assuming there is a difference between "reasoned choice" and
"rational understanding," the latter describes the required level of competence).
75. See, e.g., Bonnie, supra note 18 (discussing the need for a decisional competence standard).
76. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 412-13, 415-16 & n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (evaluating the difference
between a passive rational understanding standard and an active rational choice standard).
77. Giusso, supranote 13, at 73.
78. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 399 (noting that "there is no reason to believe that the decision to waive counsel
requires an appreciably higher level of mental functioning than the decision to waive other constitutional rights").
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And while the decision to plead guilty is undeniably a profound one, it is no
more complicated than the sum total of decisions that a defendant may be
called upon to make during the course of a trial. 79

That the Dusky standard must be understood to revolve around ability to make
rational decisions pertaining to one's status as a criminal defendant was reinforced
by Justice Kennedy, who in concurrence stated flatly that "[w]hat is at issue here is
whether the defendant has sufficient competence to take part in a criminal
proceeding and to make the decisions throughout its course."8
Accordingly, in very recent years a number of forensic theorists have embraced
the notion that decisional competence not only survived Godinez but was in fact
promoted to a protected position within the Dusky standard. 81 Significantly, a
panel of theorists and practitioners who collaborated on a comprehensive, longterm MacArthur Foundation adjudicative competence study defined decisional
competence as a discrete domain and designed a forensic assessment instrument
specifically to measure such competence.82 The MacArthur study also revealed
that discrete measurement of decisional competence might catch some defendants
who otherwise would be deemed competent.8 3 And far from being controversial,
79. Id. at 398-99 (holding that "[i]f the Dusky standard is adequate for defendants who plead not guilty, it is
necessarily adequate for those who plead guilty").
80. Id. at 403 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 406-07 (discussing single standard applicable to "the
variety of decisions that a defendant must make"). Moreover, the primacy of decision-making abilities was
reaffirmed in Cooper, in which a unanimous Court cited Godinez for the proposition that the fundamental
unfairness of trying an incompetent defendant stems from his inability to make the myriad of decisions, both large
and small, concerning the course of his defense. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 364 (1996).
81. See GRisso, supra note 13, at 73; Steven K. Hoge et al., The MacArthurAdjudicative Competence Study:
Development & Validationof a Research Instrument,21 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 141, 144 (1997) (noting that at the
heart of competence is the ability "to make rational, self-interested decisions").
82. See POYTHRESS Er AL., supra note 2, at 38 (discussing why the study findings led to a two-part test for
competence). The MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication ("MacCAT-CA") is the first
competence assessment instrument to seek to measure decision-making capacity directly.
The MacCAT-CA and the F1T-R come closer than earlier instruments to providing information that
goes beyond 'factual understanding' to begin to address questions of defendants' decision making
capacities. This is an important advance, and instruments that do not provide such information are
not in step with the evolution of the legal construct of competence in recent years.
GRusso, supra note 13, at 146. The MacArthur team, of which Bonnie was a part, agreed with Bonnie's
pre-Godinez theory that decisional competence becomes of independent significance only in cases in which the
defendant is competent to assist counsel, and that decisional deficits might be overcome with surrogate
decision-making. These particular aspects of their decisional competence formulation are not necessarily
supported by Godinez.
83. Although one quarter of the defendants studied were found to be competent to assist counsel, half of that
"competent" group were impaired on a least one decisional competence measure. See PoYTHREss Er AL., supra
note 2, at 103-04. The sample from which this data was obtained was persons who had been deemed incompetent,
implying that perhaps no discrete measurement is necessary because decisionally incompetent persons are already
being captured adequately. This is not necessarily so. The data simply show that among those adjudicated
incompetent there are persons with serious decisional deficits, and we do not know how such persons'
incompetence was captured. It remains possible that where courts and examiners are focusing solely on
non-decisional capacities such persons may be wrongly deemed competent.
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the centrality of decisional competence is widely accepted in the field of competence to consent to medical treatment.84
The extent to which a focus on decisional capacity is being implemented in the
criminal-law context, however, unquestionably is hindered by the lack of transparency in the case law, in which "rational understanding," not rational decisionmaking, remains the operative term. Expert assessments, which form the sole basis
for nearly all judicial determinations of adjudicative competence, "tend to give
little, if any, attention to decisional competence. 8 5 Even those most prominently
advocating a decisional competence approach concede that its precise meaning
within the well-established Dusky formula is not clear at present. 86 This confusion
should be put to rest. Decisional competence should be recognized as the core of
the "rational understanding" component of adjudicative competence.
C. A TheoreticalModel of Competence-RelevantDecision-Making
Having shown that rational decision-making capacity is key to Dusky rational
understanding, it is essential to define more precisely the decisions at issue. Some
decisions facing criminal defendants-for example, strategic calls as to whether to
waive indictment or demand certain forms of discovery-routinely are entrusted to
the attorney, while others plainly are the province of the defendant.8 7 These
defendant-driven decisions are whether to demand a jury trial, represent oneself,
testify on one's own behalf, be present at trial, or plead guilty. 88 More broadly, the
defendant is thought also to have the right to make global decisions as to the theory
of her defense-for example, whether to pursue an insanity defense-and the
objectives to be pursued by counsel.8 9 When we speak of decisional competence,
then, it is the competence to make these choices, and not a more general
decision-making ability, about which the law should care. And construing the
requirement of rationaldecision-making capacity in light of the goals sought to be

84. See, e.g., Louis C. Charland, Appreciation and Emotion: Theoretical Reflections on the MacArthur
Treatment Competence Study, 8 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHics J. 359, 360 (1999) (defining competence to consent to
treatment as "decision-making capacity").
85. POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2, at 11. A 1998 study concluded that examiners "primarily paid attention to
understanding and appreciation abilities and neglected the defendant's capacity to make decisions in a large
majority of the reports." Zapf& Viljoen, supra note 13, at 364 (citing Jennifer Skeem et al., Logic andReliability
of Evaluationsof Competence to Stand Trial, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 519 (1998)). This trend might shift should
the MacCAT-CA come to be more widely used.
86. See Bonnie, supra note 18, at 593-94 (arguing there are many unanswered questions about the competence
doctrine).
87. Id. at 546, 559, 568.
88. See id. at 553 & nn.57-58, 568-69 & nn.102-05, 109; see also Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 418 n.24
(1988); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269,
278-81 (1942); United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1531-1534 (11 th Cir. 1992).
89. See Bonnie, supra note 18, at 553 n.58; see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-5.2 (1986)
(listing certain decisions that are to be made by the accused and explaining, in commentary, that certain decisions
are entrusted to the lawyer).
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balanced by adjudicative competence doctrine, 90 we may conclude further that the
decisional capacity we demand of a criminal defendant is that which renders her
capable of making critical defendant-driven decisions in a minimally rational and
self-protective manner.
Still, the content of such "rationality" requires yet further explication. Rationality is far from self-defining. 91 Though it is difficult to articulate the components of
decision-making processes, and more difficult still to judge the rationality of their
operation, recent decades have seen significant advances in our understanding of
such processes.92 Exploring the relevance of such research for adjudicative
competence and demonstrating how a decision-making focus sometimes is invoked in the cases illuminates an approach that may give substance to the sketchy
outlines of Dusky rational understanding.
The literature on decision-making is vast,9 3 but there is some degree of
consensus as to the necessary building blocks of the types of decisions faced by
criminal defendants. As an initial matter, most agree that a focus on rationality
should look to process rather than outcome, despite the fact that the latter is far
more accessible. 94 The danger of adopting a predominantly outcome-driven test
for competence-relevant rationality is that it may encourage examiners and courts
simply to substitute their judgments for those of defendants whose choices appear
misguided.9 5 Judging reasonableness of outcome can play an important role, as
manifestly bizarre or self-destructive decisions might be evidence of a faulty

90. See supra pp. 1381-1382; cf Steven J. Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, 74 So. CAL. L. REv. 251,
254 (2005) (arguing rationality can take on many meanings depending on the context and social mores); Steven J.
Morse, DiminishedRationality,Diminished Responsibility, 1IOo ST. J. CRIM. L. 289, 295 (2003) ("How much
rational capacity must be impaired under what conditions to warrant excuse or mitigation is, of course, a
normative, moral, political, and legal question."). While Morse's discussions of rationality are positioned within a
discussion of responsibility, they nonetheless may inform understanding of the concept within the competence
construct.
91. See Steven J. Morse, Brain and Blame, 84 GEO. L.J. 527, 530 (1996) ("There is no uncontroversial
definition of rationality.").
92. See, e.g., Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison, Thinking and Reasoning: A Reader's Guide, in THE
CAMBIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING 1, 3 (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison eds., 2005)

("Thinking and reasoning, long the academic province of philosophy, have over the past century emerged as core
topics of empirical investigation and theoretical analysis in the modem fields known as cognitive psychology,
cognitive science, and cognitive neuroscience.").
93. An overview of this complex topic goes far beyond the project of this Article. For an introduction to the
field, see generally EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH (Sandra L. Schneider &
James Shanteau eds., 2003); JUDGMENT AND DEcISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER (Terry Connolly et
al. eds., 2d ed. 2000).
94. See, e.g., Winick, supra note 6, at 966 (noting it is both tempting and "easy to confuse the quality of the
decision-making process with the reasonableness of the result reached").
95. See, e.g., Saks & Behnke, supra note 38, at 124 (arguing that we should avoid "declaring people who make
good choices competent and people who make bad choices incompetent"); see also Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d
1546, 1566 & n.15 (10th Cir. 1992) (Brorby, J., dissenting) (objecting to the court's use of defendant's
unsuccessful trial strategy as a basis for determining incompetence).
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process, but it is to that process that the search for rationality should be directed.9 6
Decision-making processes generally may be described as consisting of perception, understanding, reasoning, and choice. 97 One making a "rational" decision
should have at least minimally intact ability to: (1) perceive the world accurately;
(2) think coherently about those perceptions and thereby form valid understandings; (3) run those understandings through a sound reasoning process guided by
personally relevant goals; and (4) imagine a conclusion logically flowing from that
process, express that conclusion to others, and formulate and execute a course of
action flowing logically from the preceding steps.9 8 Each of these steps is both
theoretically and practically complex (and a potential site for a finding that a
defendant lacks decisional competence).
The extent to which courts have examined defendants' competence with
reference to a decision-making model is quite limited. However, certain helpful
clues as to such a model's utility may be found in the treatment of defendants with
severe thought disorder. 99
96. See Bonnie, supra note 18, at 575 (noting the importance of the decisional process, rather than the outcome
of that process).
97. In the competence context, these abilities generally are grouped under the headings of understanding,
appreciation, reasoning, and choice. See PoYTHREss ET At., supra note 2, at 48 ('Taken together, these four criteria
operationalize the 'rationality' requirement to which the Supreme Court referred in Godinez v. Moran (1993).").
The MacCAT-CA, designed to reflect this theory of competence, measures only the first three. See id. at 59-68
(evaluating factual understanding, reasoning, and appreciation). Because I consider appreciation to be an aspect
and believe it important to consider the threshold role of perception, I prefer
of understanding, see infra Part II.A.,
the formulation of perception, understanding, reasoning, and choice.
98. See Saks & Behnke, supra note 38, at 114 (noting competence to consent to medical treatment requires
"understanding relevant information; assessing the evidence and forming appropriate beliefs about it; reasoning
about the evidence with a degree of intactness; and communicating a choice"); Appelbaum, supra note 33, at 379
(determining that "competence for decision making" consists of "the abilities: to express a choice; to understand
relevant information; to appreciate the significance of that information for one's own situation; and to reason with
relevant information so as to engage in a logical process of weighing options") (citing Jessica W. Berg et al.,
Constructing Competence: Formulating Standards of Legal Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48
RUTGERS L. REv. 345 (1996)); Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and IrrationalPeople, 88 VA. L. REv.
1025, 1067 (2002) (discussing the requirements of accurate perception, instrumental reasoning, evaluation of
actions, and weighing of decisions).
99. To simplify a somewhat confusing nomenclature, "thought disorder" refers herein to dysfunction in
cognitive thought processes that is identified by its effect on either the content or form of speech. See Peter
Bachman & Tyrone D. Cannon, Cognitive and Neuroscience Aspects of Thought Disorder,in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING, supra note 92, at 494 (noting that thought disorder, thus defined, is a
type of dysfunction generally occurring "within the context of a more extensive psychopathology, including
diagnoses as diverse as schizophrenia, mood disorders, certain personality disorders, and autism") (citations
omitted). This definition is not entirely consistent with that of "formal thought disorder," which historically has
been defined as the speech impairment itself rather than the underlying cause. The Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders acknowledges the "difficulty inherent in developing an objective definition of
'thought disorder"' and therefore focuses in its description of schizophrenia on the concept of "disorganized
speech." DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS TExT REvIsIoN 300 (4th ed. 2000)

[hereinafter DSM-1V-TR]. However, the speech disorders typical of thought disorder are best regarded as
symptoms of underlying defects in cognitive processing. See Bachman & Cannon, supra, at 493, 495, 498
(discussing examples of patients with thought disorders and problems with cognitive processing). A disorder of
"thought content" generally will include hallucinations (sensory perceptions not based in reality, for example,
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Persons with severe thought disorder, particularly those diagnosed with schizophrenia, often are labeled "psychotic,"' 0 0 and psychosis is very strongly associated
with findings of adjudicative incompetence.'0° Indeed, it appears that many
examiners regard psychosis as the sine qua non of incompetence, starting and
ending their analysis with that diagnosis.10 2 Unfortunately, the underlying rationale as to why the thought disorder associated with psychosis is thought to disrupt
Dusky rationality seldom is made plain. Indeed, few courts have attempted to
define Dusky rational understanding at all, let alone by reference to decisionmaking processes. 103 There are, however, several prominent exceptions.

hearing voices or seeing visions) or delusions (understandings and beliefs similarly unrelated to reality). See
DSM-IV-TR, supra, at 299 (defining delusions as disorders of thought content, while characterizing hallucinations as disorders of perception). 'Thought form" disorder describes a "disorganization of underlying thought
processes indicated by abnormal speech," for example, highly tangential speech (sometimes called a "flight of
ideas") or the confusing jumble of loose associations sometimes called "word salad." Bachman & Cannon, supra,
at 495-96. Cases that explicitly discuss the "disordered thought form" manifestation are scarce. However, it is not
unusual to see embedded within cases descriptions of bizarre speech that suggest the presence of disordered
thought form. For example, the defendant in Strickland v. Francis,738 F.2d 1542, 1544-45 n.3 (1 th Cir. 1984),
exhibited various forms of nonsensical speech, including repeated and acontextual use of the word "'supplemental,"' evidencing "'a certain disorganization of thought process."' See also United States v. Hemsi, 901 F.2d 293,
294-95 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that the incompetent defendant's testimony was "rambling, confused, irrelevant, or
incomprehensible," at one point devolving into "a profane and scatological barrage"); State v. Haycock, 766 A.2d
720, 722 (N.H. 2001) (defendant "tend[ed] to 'ramble' and his 'thoughts' [were] 'tangential' and 'paranoid"'); cf
Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Charles, 72 F.3d 401,405-09 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding the paranoid schizophrenic
defendant's record colloquies were "rambling" but not entirely "incoherent"; he was deemed competent to
represent himself and reject an insanity defense); United States v. Housh, 89 F Supp. 2d 1227, 1230 (D. Kan.
2000) (noting, in support of competency finding, that defendant's "speech was normal in content and form").
Though the cases do not make this clear, a thought-form disorder could impair the communication with counsel
prong of Dusky as well as the rational understanding of the proceedings prong.
100. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 99, at 297-98 (offering varied definitions of psychosis and psychotic
symptoms, all of which include delusions or hallucinations, some of which include disorganized speech and
behavior).
Note that what this Article defines as "thought disorder" may also be found in non-psychotic mental illnesses,
such as amnesia, delirium, and dementia. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 99, at 135-80. These phenomena also may
be highly relevant to an adjudicative competence determination. See, e.g., United States v. Rinchack, 820 F.2d
1557, 1569 (11th Cir. 1987) (discussing standards by which to evaluate defendant's amnesia); United States v.
Borum, 464 F.2d 896, 900 (10th Cir. 1972) (holding that defendant must show prejudice from having amnesia in
that he cannot provide the necessary facts to his attorney); Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460, 463-64 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (discussing the standards for evaluating the competence of an amnesia patient). While these issues go
beyond the purview of this Article, the methodological approach advocated in this Part applies equally to such
mental disorders.
101. See Jodi L. Viljoen et al., Diagnosis, Current Symptomatology, and the Ability to Stand Trial, 3 J.
FoP,ENsic PSYCHOL. PRAc. 23, 23-25, 30 (2003) (noting that no non-psychotic individual in the sample was
deemed incompetent, while nearly 20% of the psychotic defendants were; "research has consistently found that
defendants with psychotic disorders are more likely to be judged unfit than those with non-psychotic disorders,"
and "hallucinations and delusions" are particularly associated with such judgments).
102. See, e.g., Liles v. Saffle, 945 F2d 333, 339 (10th Cir. 1991) (disapproving of an examiner who "was of the
belief that only psychotic individuals could be considered incompetent, and any individual who was nonpsychotic was therefore competent").
103. See, e.g., Housh, 89 F Supp. 2d at 1229 ("[F]ew reported Tenth Circuit cases have given meaning to the
'rational understanding' phraseology used by the Dusky Court.").
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Those courts that have attempted to explain the relevance of psychosis to
adjudicative competence generally have located the operative decision-making
defects at the stages of perception and understanding. Perception, or the human
body's transformation of sensory stimuli into internal images,'1 4 is a crucial
threshold requirement, 10 5 but is not as straightforward as it may seem. Because
sensory stimuli are transformed into conscious perceptions by complex (and
largely nonconscious) neural processes, factors ranging from stress to neurological
disorder can intervene, with sometimes seriously distorting consequences, between percept and perception.10 6 Once an object is perceived, with or without prior
distortion, a decider will form thoughts and beliefs-or understandings-about
it. 107 Generally accurate understandings about relevant aspects of the external
like perception, necessary but not sufficient for competent decisionworld are,
08
making.1
Defendants with severe psychosis frequently display perceptual and understanding processes that are so profoundly distorted as to obviate competence. Such was
the conclusion in Lafferty v. Cook,'09 an unusually thoughtful decision by a sharply
split Tenth Circuit panel. Ronald Lafferty was diagnosed as suffering from a
"paranoid delusional state" but deemed competent; he then attempted suicide by
hanging, and four examiners opined that Lafferty's "paranoid delusional system,"
aggravated by oxygen deprivation to his brain, had rendered him incompetent by

104. William M. Goldstein & Robin M. Hogarth, Judgment and Decision Research: Some HistoricalContext,
in RESEARCH ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: CURRENTS, CONNECTIONS, AND CONTROvERStIEs 3, 7 (William

M. Goldstein & Robin M. Hogarth eds., 1997) (noting perception is the process by which "an object in the
environment ... stimulates a person's sensory organs to produce multiple cues ... to the object's identity and
properties").
105. It is hard to imagine a competent defendant who lacks anything approaching normal perceptive abilities;
we would not, for example, consider trying a comatose person. Perceptive deficits short of coma may also cause
incompetence. Theon Jackson, for example, who was deaf and could not speak, was considered incompetent in
large part because his disabilities were so extreme as to forestall any communication with counsel. See Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 717-18 (1972) (noting as well that Jackson was developmentally disabled). Though one
imagines that a defendant like Jackson could now be rendered competent because of improved methods for
communicating with the developmentally disabled and hearing impaired, it is possible to imagine a defendant for
whom no accommodation is sufficient.
106. See, e.g., Goldstein & Hogarth, supra note 104, at 7 (noting perception involves "the psychological
construction or inference of a percept from an incomplete and fallible collection of sensory cues").
107. "Thinking," as "the systematic transformation of mental representations of knowledge to characterize
actual or possible states of the world, often in service of goals," is a bridge between perception and understanding.
Holyoak & Morrison, supra note 92, at 2 (emphasis omitted).
108. Recall that Dusky could understand the parameters of his situation and relate with accuracy certain
relevant facts. Dusky v. United States, 271 F.2d 385, 389 (8th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
See also Saks & Behnke, supra note 38, at 113 ("Pure understanding" is necessary but not sufficient; "[b]ecause
making a decision in one's best interests requires assessing how those interests are likely to be affected, the patient
must be able to form adequate beliefs in order to be a competent decision maker.").
109. 949 F.2d 1546, 1548 (10th Cir. 1992). Lafferty, a former Mormon who was excommunicated from the
Church of Latter-Day Saints for "unorthodox religious views," murdered several persons whom he believed had
supported his wife in leaving him.
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impairing "his ability to perceive and interpret reality." '" ° Lafferty's delusions
included the strong belief that all those involved in his case-including his
lawyer-"were part of a corrupt man-made order" against which he was required
by God to rebel."' Because he displayed factual understanding of the proceedings, 112 the majority recognized that its task was to determine the meaning of
Dusky's rational understanding requirement.' 1 3 After examining the trial record in
Dusky the majority determined that "a defendant lacks the requisite rational
understanding if his mental condition precludes him from perceiving accurately,
interpreting, and/or responding appropriately to the world around him."' 1 4 Thus,
the majority concluded, "sufficient contact with reality"
is the "touchstone for
' 5
ascertaining the existence of a rational understanding." "
This test, focused primarily on the effects of psychosis on perception and
understanding, has been adopted by a small handful of other courts.' 1 6 In In re
Heidnik, for example, the Third Circuit found a death row inmate incompetent to
abandon appeals" t 7 because his decisions were based on a flawed "perception of

110. Id. at 1552.
111. Id.
112. Like Dusky, Lafferty "physically knew the nature of the proceedings against him, and their possible
consequences." Id.
113. Id. at 1550 ("The aspect of the Dusky standard that is the critical focus of attention in this case is the
requirement that a defendant have a rationalas well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.").
114. Id. at 1551.
115. Id.
The state court paid lip service to Dusky's requirement that competency requires a rational
understanding which is different from, and more than, factual understanding. Nonetheless, in view
of the evidence that Lafferty's illness interfered with his accurate perception of reality, the court's
statements that Lafferty's understanding was rational simply renders that requirement a nullity.
Id. at 1556.
116. The Second Circuit, in a pre-Lafferty decision, agreed that a defendant's "impaired sense of reality" can,
where it prevents him from "focusing on his legal needs and from acting effectively on his intellectual
understanding" of his position, cause him to be unable to "make any rational decisions regarding the defense."
United States v. Hemsi, 901 F.2d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Bryan v. Gibson, 276 F.3d 1163, 1170 (10th Cir.
2001) (aff'd in part and vacated in part by Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2003)) (finding that
"sufficient contact with reality" is "the touchstone for ascertaining the existence of rational understanding" and
affirming the jury's factual determination that the defendant was competent to stand trial (quoting Lafferty v.
Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1551 (10th Cir. 1992))); United States v. Housh, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1230-31 (D. Kan.
2000) (finding that the defendant met the Dusky "rational understanding" standard, in part because his mental
deficits did not affect his perception of reality to a great extent); State v. Haycock, 766 A.2d 720, 722 (N.H. 2001)
(adopting Lafferty's "sufficient contact with reality" standard of rational understanding); Wilcoxson v. State, 22
S.W.3d 289, 305 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (requiring the defendant to have sufficient contact with reality to be
found competent); cf. Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222, 1241 (10th Cir. 2000) (rejecting defendant's claim that his
homophobia was enough of an "irrational conviction" to make him incompetent).
117. 112 F.3d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1997) (per curiam) ("Lafferty is in accord with our distinction between factual
and rational understanding."). The competence relevant to appointment of a next friend is a dominant frame
through which the competence of severely depressed prisoners is measured. Because the Rees v. Peyton test refers
specifically to defects in a death-row inmate's "premises," 384 U.S. 312, 314, it is particularly likely that courts
faced with a Rees challenge will focus on pre-reasoning defects in factual premises. This point is explored further
in Part ll.B. 1.
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reality,"' 8 including "fixed false beliefs" that his victims had killed themselves
and that his execution would lead to the end of capital punishment. These
delusional beliefs were "all-encompassing in nature" and colored "every aspect of
his cognitive functioning,"" 9 with the result that Heidnik was "seeing people as
other than what they are." 120 A similar approach was recently taken as well in Utah
v. Mitchell, in which Brian David Mitchell was found incompetent to stand trial for
the kidnapping of Salt Lake City teenager Elizabeth Smart. 12 ' After determining
that Mitchell suffered from a delusional disorder characterized by fixed, false
beliefs (including that Smart was destined to be his wife and that God required his
conviction and imprisonment in order to trigger an eventual personal battle with
the Antichrist),122 the court concluded that his "ability to accurately perceive and
interpret external reality" was unduly impaired. 123 The court therefore found him
unable to make rational choices, which it equated with the "rational understanding" required by both Utah law and Dusky. 12 4 Thus, as these cases demonstrate,
severe defects in perception and understanding can impede a defendant's ability to
make decisions on his own behalf.
Defects in reasoning-the process by which one draws inferences and conclusions from premises 125-also can defeat competence. Flaws in logical reasoning
are perhaps the most obvious and intuitive examples of irrationality; for example,
were a defendant to understand (and believe) that all defense attorneys are their

118. Heidnik, 112 F.3d at 109 & n.4.
119. Id. at 109.
120. Id. at 110.
121. Utah v. Mitchell, No. 031901884 (Third Judicial District Court, Memorandum of Judge Judith S.
Atherton, dated July 26, 2005).
122. Two prominent forensic theorists, Jennifer Skeem and Stephen Golding, found Mitchell to be suffering
from a delusional disorder that obviated adjudicative competence. See id. at 25, 32-33. Much of their evaluations,
and the court's, centered on the difficult issue of distinguishing between a fixed delusional belief system and
religious beliefs that, though unconventional, are properly regarded as non-delusional and even protected. This
same issue was presented in Lafferty, which also concerned a Utah defendant who had been removed from the
Church of Latter-Day Saints. This issue, as well as that of defendants with potentially "delusional" political
beliefs and motivations, warrants a far more careful explication than is possible here.
123. Id. at 58 (citing to Lafferty). The court continued:
Since having the capacity to realistically determine what is in one's own best interest is nothing
more or less than having the ability to make reasoned, rational choices, it follows from the court's
conclusion that because Defendant's religious belief system is the basis upon which he makes
decisions concerning his criminal case, he also lacks the capacity to consult with counsel with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding and is... incompetent to proceed to trial.
Id.
124. Utah law, while largely parroting Dusky, also spells out in more detail the precise abilities subsumed
under the general standard, and in those sections it articulates that a defendant must be able to "engage in reasoned
choice of legal strategies and options." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15-5(4)(a)(i)-(vii) (2005). The Mitchell court
reasoned that because Godinez rejected any distinction between "reasoned choice" and "rational understanding,"
the rational understanding standard incorporates the ability to make rational decisions about one's criminal case.
Mitchell, No. 031901884 at 5 n.2; see supraPart I.A.
125. See, e.g., Holyoak & Morison, supranote 92, at 2.
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clients' advocates, and that the person assigned to represent her is a defense
attorney, and yet conclude that her defense attorney is the state's advocate, we
might well conclude that her logical reasoning powers are impaired. Significantly,
though, such defects seldom are reflected in the cases; instead, as the above cases
demonstrate, at least with regard to psychotic defendants, courts have found
incompetence despite intact logical capacity. This makes sense: while deductive
reasoning is a necessary component for competence, 126 it is far from sufficient, for
such reasoning maps quite poorly onto real-world decision-making, in which the
validity of premises matters and where decisional conditions are often confusing
and in flux. ' 27 Flexible reasoning-which requires fluid intelligence, ability to use
deductive and inductive reasoning as appropriate, and incorporation of background goals, knowledge, and learning-provides a more appropriate model for
the reasoning process underlying the pragmatic, real-world decision-making faced
by criminal defendants.1 2 Thus, though Lafferty's reasoning was logical-his
conclusions and decisions, such as a desire to discharge counsel and refrain from
presenting an insanity defense, were consistent with his premises-the court
found
29
it dispositive that delusional beliefs irredeemably distorted his premises. 1
The extent to which courts have identified competence-threatening defects in
choice-including the component steps of formulating a conclusion, expressing
that conclusion, and taking action accordingly-is limited. Choice warrants
separate articulation, 130 as it is possible that a defendant might display valid
reasoning on the basis of sound premises and yet reach a conflicting or somehow
126. Saks & Behnke, supra note 38, at 113 (arguing that to be competent one "must also be able to reason with
some degree of intactness. Reasoning allows one to put together the relevant information one has purely
understood and, having assessed, has formed beliefs about.").
127. Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, Deductive Reasoning, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND
REASONING, supra note 92, at 169, 170, 175, 179. "It is no longer appropriate to equate performance on deductive
reasoning tasks with rationality or to assume that logic provides an appropriate normative account of everyday,
real world reasoning." Id. at 181.
128. See Keith J. Holyoak, Analogy, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING, supra note

92, at 117, 118 (noting that "fluid intelligence" is the ability to reason with novel information); Steven A. Sloman
& David A. Lagnado, The Problem of Induction, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING,
supranote 92, at 95-97 (stating that like deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning "concerns the logical relations
that hold between statements irrespective of their truth or falsity. In the case of inductive logic, however, these
relations admit of varying strengths, a conditional probability measure reflecting the rationaldegree of belief that
someone should have in a hypothesis given the available evidence.").
129. Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1554-55 (10th Cir. 1992) ("This court cannot accept as consistent with
Dusky and its progeny a finding of competency made under the view that a defendant who is unable to accurately
perceive reality due to a paranoid delusional system need only act consistently with his paranoiddelusion to be
consideredcompetent to stand trial." (emphasis added)); see also In re Heidnik, 112 F.3d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1997)
(per curiam) (finding Heidnik incompetent despite his "considerable intelligence and expressive powers"). These
courts rejected as sufficient what Kahneman and Frederick describe as "coherence rationality," or "the strict
conception that requires the agent's entire system of beliefs and preferences to be internally consistent and
immune to effects of framing and context." Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, A Model of Heuristic
Judgment, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING, supranote 92, at 267,277.

130. Though heavily reliant on the prior stages, choice additionally requires "assessment of the value of an
option or the probability that it will yield a certain payoff (judgment) coupled with choice among alternatives
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irrational conclusion,13 1 lack ability to communicate her choices, 132 or be unable
to act in accordance with her choices. For example, the record indicates that
Lafferty may have had additional defects in this domain, as he had chosen to
discharge counsel but was unable to take action implementing that choice. For
reasons that he apparently would not explain, Lafferty refused to put his expressed
desire to represent himself on
the record in the required form, with the result that
133
counsel was not discharged.
The Lafferty, In re Heidnik, and Mitchell decisions represent some of the only
examples of an overt attempt by the courts to define rational understanding, let
alone an attempt to do so by reference to an articulation of the affected stages of a
rational decision-making process. This approach is far from uncontroversial. The
dissenting judge in Lafferty, for example, took strong issue with what he saw as the
majority's misguided "quest to articulate the one true legal definition of competency."1 34 Such criticism, though, is overcome by the significant advantages of a
transparent and finely grained approach. In the case of psychosis incorporating
delusional perception and understanding, one clear benefit of locating the site of
dysfunction and teasing out its effect is avoidance of, on the one hand, overinclusion attending simplistic equation of psychosis with incompetence1 35 and, on
the other, under-inclusion attending simplistic reliance on logic as the sine qua non

(decision making)," as well as "construction of a course of action that can achieve a goal." Holyoak & Morrison,
supra note 92, at 2.
131. For example, a defendant who believes that she will be punished by God for escaping a jail term might
conclude that it is in her best interest to reject a plea offer, despite her ability to reason through why the offer is
otherwise in her best interest. The belief is a factor that intervenes between the preliminary conclusion (it is good
to take the offer) and the ultimate conclusion (it is bad to take the offer). Clearly, these stages of judgment and
decision-making overlap heavily. See, e.g., Holyoak & Morrison, supra note 92, at 3.
132. For example, because of his communication deficits, Theon Jackson would not have been able to express
a choice as to the course of his defense even had he the ability to arrive at one. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S.
715,718-19 (1972).
133. Lafferty, 949 F.2d at 1549.
134. Id. at 1557-58 (Brorby, J., dissenting). In the dissent's view, the finding of competence was adequately
grounded in record evidence of Lafferty's intellectual functioning and the prosecution's expert testimony offering
"a generally functional view of rationality centering on whether a person can piece things together, see
relationship between incidents, remember information, and thereby factually and theoretically assist in his
defense." Id. at 1564-66; cf. State v. Barnes, 948 P.2d 617, 638 (Kan. 1997) (holding that expert reports of
defendant's delusions and paranoia were overcome by evidence that he "had comprehension of the roles of the
various participants in the trial," understood the charges and possible consequences, and "was able to respond
appropriately in court and cooperate with his attorney").
135. Consider the following "typical colloquy between judge and psychiatrist: 'Doctor, is he incompetent?'
'Your Honor, he is psychotic!' Burt & Morris, supra note 11, at 92 & n.109. For example, were a psychotic
defendant's delusional thinking limited to the belief that she is actually a Russian princess, such belief may or may
not have any effect on ability to protect her interests in a criminal proceeding, particularly if her notions as to the
relevant facts and law comport closely to those relevant to one who is not a Russian princess. Similarly, were her
psychosis limited to occasional auditory hallucinations that did not touch on the subject matter of the trial or cause
her to become confused, distracted, or inappropriate in conversations with her attorney or during trial, they may
not threaten competence.
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of competence. 36 But the methodological benefits go even further, as thoughtcontent disorders are not the only sort to warrant such an articulation; these may
just be the easiest cases. A defendant like Mitchell may be relatively easy to
identify should he choose to verbalize his beliefs, delusional by any objective
standard. Certainly other, possibly less obvious, disorders might have equivalent
impact. These cases therefore are valuable also because they model an approach
that can be applied to other disorders, including-as the next Part proposesemotional disorders.
As this Part has shown, then, a model of human decision-making-even a basic
one such as that offered here-incorporates a number of complex underlying
concepts, each of which represents a site of potentially competence-threatening
"irrationality."' 37 In the case of psychosis, the most endangered sites appear to be
perception and understanding, though defects at those stages also will frustrate
flexible reasoning and potentially destabilize choice. Perhaps not surprisingly,
then, despite controversy over methodology, the conclusion that severe impairment to a defendant's cognitive processes-particularly that associated with
thought-content disorder-can defeat the presumption of competence is reflected
in a number of cases. 138 It also has been urged by scholars writing in the area of
39
competence to consent to medical treatment. 1
Largely missing from this traditional account of decision-making and its
relevance to adjudicative competence, however, is the influence of emotion.
Defendants with profound impairments of emotional perception, processing, and
expression may be equally unable to make self-interested rational decisions,
although they may appear to be in touch with reality in a way that psychotic
persons often do not. That is the subject of the following Part.
II. EMOTIONAL COMPETENCE AND RATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

As the preceding Part explained, the key to Dusky rational understanding is
whether a criminal defendant is capable of making defendant-driven decisionssuch as whether to plead guilty, discharge counsel, raise an insanity defense,
present mitigating evidence, and challenge or acquiesce to her conviction and
136. See, e.g., Lafferty, 949 F.2d at 1557-58 (Brorby, J., dissenting) (comparing defendant's lack of severe
symptoms to Dusky's severe symptoms); see also Rumbaugh v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 395, 404 (5th Cir. 1985)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting) (discussing how logic is a central part of evaluating a choice, and in turn, competence).
137. Of course, many irrational and nonrational processes, such as reliance on common heuristics and biases,
might threaten normative "rationality" in an important sense and yet not signal incompetence. See infra Part III.
138. See Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1032-33 (8th Cir. 2003) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (discussing
defendant's delusions and references to himself as God and that he was commissioned by God); Strickland v.
Francis, 738 F.2d 1542, 1546, 1551 (1lth Cir. 1984) ("Strickland was out of touch with reality and totally
incapable of assisting in his defense"; he "suffered from delusional characteristics and had psychotic disorders
that made itdifficult for him to deal with reality."); Bruce v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051, 1063 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding
that defendant's schizophrenia "caused him to misperceive important elements of the proceedings").
139. See, e.g., Saks & Behnke, supra note 38, at 116-17, 119, 123. "Accurate beliefs about the world are
essential to competency, because decisions take effect in the world." Id. at 116.
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sentence-with recourse to at least minimally intact rational decision-making
processes. Such a determination requires a highly particularized inquiry into
whether the defendant's perception and understanding of relevant aspects of the
world are accurate; whether she is able to engage in appropriately flexible
reasoning; and whether she can formulate, express, maintain, and implement
choices. Such a determination should be made in light of the specific demands of
the criminal case, with an eye always toward whether the defendant's decisionmaking capacities permit her to hold up her end of a highly adversarial proceeding.
Before the defendant is found incompetent on the basis of a flaw at any
decision-making juncture, an examiner or court should be able to articulate the
origin of that fault and explain how it is thought to disrupt rationality.
All evidence suggests that no such approach is being implemented. Because
judicial determinations almost always rest entirely on the recommendation of
experts, and because those experts generally do not explain either their methodology or the basis for their conclusions, it is very difficult to know what underlies
most adjudicative competence decisions. 4 ° But to the extent that examiners and
courts sometimes reveal their conception of the distinction between a "rational"
and "factual" understanding, it appears clear that the generally operative concept
of Dusky rationality is focused almost entirely on disordered cognitive processes,
such as those seen in thought disorder. The role of emotional disorder, though
sometimes mentioned, remains almost entirely unexplored.14 1 Indeed, it is sometimes deliberately disregarded.
This Part, then, seeks to articulate, with reference to the decision-making model
presented in Part I, the theoretical underpinnings of an adjudicative competence
standard that incorporates a sophisticated understanding of emotion. The two
examples it explores, depression and brain damage, represent two situations in
which severe emotional dysfunction might disrupt the rational decision-making
capacity demanded by Dusky but to which a purely cognitive approach is
particularly ill-suited.
A. The Role of Emotion in Decision-Making
Emotion is implicated in decision-making processes at many, or perhaps all, of

140. See, e.g., Giusso, supra note 13, at 79 ("Little is known empirically about the methods that clinicians
actually use in collecting data for competence to stand trial evaluations.").
141. Like the distinction between cognition and emotion, see infra pp. 1402-1403, that between a thought
disorder and an emotional disorder is overly simplified. Many mental illnesses in which thought disorder plays a
prominent role-for example, schizophrenia-commonly also have affective elements, such as blunted affect.
See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 99, at 298. Similarly, affective disorders-such as clinical depression-commonly
entail cognitive deficits. See id. at 348-49. But these distinctions between and among disorders reflect that certain
dysfunctions are more about one than the other, which is part of how they are clinically distinguished.
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the junctures described in the previous Part. 14 2 Its role, however, historically has
been both underexplored and undervalued.143 As a result, emotion is more poorly
understood than are the various cognitive mechanisms underlying human decisionmaking. Fortunately, this situation is changing rapidly. 44 But despite these
advances, no concerted effort has been made to tie contemporary emotion research
into the formulation of competence-relevant decision-making.' 45 Because of
emotion's importance, such an effort is vital.
The first task is to define emotion, which is used here as an umbrella term
encompassing the concepts of emotion, feelings, mood, and affect. 1 4 6 Theorists
generally agree on the existence of certain "core" emotions-including fear, anger,

142. See Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Evolutionary Psychology and the Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF
EMOTIONS 91, 93 (Michael Lewis & Jeanette M. Haviland-Jones eds., 2d ed. 2000) (arguing that emotion's
function is
to direct the activities and interactions of the subprograms governing perception; attention;
inference; learning; memory; goal choice; motivational priorities; categorization and conceptual
frameworks; physiological reactions ... ; reflexes; behavioral decision rules; motor systems;
communication processes; energy level and effort allocation; affective coloration of events and
stimuli; recalibration of probability estimates, situation assessments, values, and regulatory
variables... and so on .... );
Nicole A. Roberts et al., The Impact of Orbital Prefrontal Cortex Damage on Emotional Activation to
Unanticipatedand Anticipated Acoustic Startle Stimuli, 4 COGNITIVE, AFFECrIVE, & BEHAv. NEUROSCIENCE 307,
316 (2004) ("[D]eviations in emotional response" in certain brain-damaged patients "can be expected to have an
adverse impact on such cognitive processes as attention, learning, memory, and decision making, all of which are
profoundly influenced by emotional reactions.").
143. Melissa L. Finucane et al., Judgment and Decision Making: The Dance of Affect and Reason, in
EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH, supra note 93, at 327, 329 ("Affect has ...

rarely been recognized as an important component in research and theory in judgment and decision making.");
Alice M. Isen & Aparna A. Labroo, Some Ways in Which Positive Affect Facilitates Decision Making and
Judgment, in EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH, supra note 93, at 365, 367 (noting

that "the field of decision making has been slow to incorporate research on affect"); Ola Svenson, Values, Affect,
and Processesin Human Decision Making: A Differentiationand ConsolidationTheory Perspective,in EMERGING
PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH, supra note 93, at 287, 296 (noting that "the very strong
emphasis on cognitive functions in decision research during the past few decades has led to neglect of the roles of
affect, emotional involvement, and affective components in decision processes").
144. See Isen & Labroo, supra note 143, at 366 (discussing the increasing interest in affect); Svenson, supra
note 143, at 289 ("[D]ecision researchers are becoming increasingly interested in the effects of emotion and affect
on human decision processes."). An overview of the study of emotion is beyond the scope of this Article. See
generally HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS, supra note 142; HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES (Richard J. Davidson et
al. eds., 2003); EMOTIONS: ESSAYS ON EMOTION THEORY (Stephanie H.M. van Goozen et al. eds., 1994);
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE OF EMOTION (Richard D. Lane & Lynn Nadel eds., 2000).

145. The one instance in which such a connection has been urged is within a small debate in the area of
capacity to consent to medical treatment. See Charland, supra note 84 (arguing emotions play a positive role in
determining competence); Louis C. Charland, Is Mr Spock Mentally Competent? Competence to Consent and
Emotion, 5 PHIL., PSYCHIATRY, & PSYCHOL. 67 (1998) (arguing emotions are essential to competence); see also 5
PHIL., PSYCHIATRY, & PSYCHOL, 83 (1998) (compiling articles responding to Charland).

146. See Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field,30 LAW & HuM.
BEHAV. 119, 123-24 & n.19 (2006) (using a similar definition). For a treatment of definitional debates within
emotion theory, see generally THE NATURE OF EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS 3, 51 (Paul Ekman & Richard
J. Davidson eds., 1994).

1402

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1375

happiness, sadness, surprise, and disgust-a repertoire on which humans demonstrate many variations. 14 7 "Affect" refers to the positive or negative quality of a
feeling-state, but is used also to describe the manner in which a person externalizes
feeling-states-for example, one whose facial expressions appear to display no
emotion is said to have a "flat affect."' 14 8 "Mood" refers to feeling-states-such as
anxiety and depression-that are "more
transient, diffuse, and less attributable to
49
1
emotions.
than
sources"
particular
Fundamentally, each of these aspects of emotion is thought to be in important
respects both separate and separable from "cognition," 150 which refers generally to
intellectual or "thinking" processes (including many that operate below the level
of consciousness) not necessarily imbued with emotional content.15 1 In recent
years most emotion theorists have come to agree that this dividing line is anything
153
but sharp,' 52 and that many, perhaps all, emotions have cognitive aspects.
Nonetheless, the two realms are still helpfully conceptualized separately, even as

147. However, multiple taxonomies of the emotions have been offered, with different lineups. See, e.g.,
ROBERT PLUTCHIK, EMOTION: A PSYCHOEVOLUTIONARY THEsis 133 (1980) (describing eight basic emotions);
James A. Russell, A Circumplex Model of Affect, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 1161, 1163 (1980)
(describing eight emotions on a sliding four-directional plane).
148. See, e.g., THE NATURE OF EMOTION, supra note 146, at 49-96, 184, 199; Paul Slovic, What's FearGot to
Do with It? It's Affect We Need to Worry About, 69 Mo. L. REV. 971, 971, 989 (2004). Affect is sometimes also
used in the global sense here proposed for "emotion." See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Does Mood Influence Moral
Judgment?An EmpiricalTest with Legal and Policy Implications,29 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 3 (2005).
149. Blumenthal, supra note 148, at 3.
150. See, e.g., Gerald L. Clore, For Love or Money: Some Emotional Foundations of Rationality, 80
CHI.-KET L. REV. 1151, 1153 (2005) ("If cognition is about truth and falsity and is concerned with
categorization, then emotion is about goodness and badness and is concerned with evaluation."); Carroll E. Izard,
Cognition Is One of Four Types of Emotion-Activating Systems, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION, supra note 146, at
203,204 ("Emotion is about motivation, cognition about knowledge."); Daniel M.T. Fessler et al., Angry Men and
Disgusted Women: An EvolutionaryApproach to the Influence of Emotions on Risk Taking, 95 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 107, 118 (2004) ("[E]motions constitute a relatively autonomous channel of
influence on decision making, operating in conjunction with, but largely independent of, more strictly cognitive
processes.") (citation omitted).
151. See, e.g., Joseph E. LeDoux, Cognitive-EmotionalInteractionsin the Brain, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION,
supra note 146, at 216 (arguing that cognition "is nothing more than a word that we use to describe a group of
related but diverse information-processing functions, including sensory processing, perception, imagery, attention, memory, reasoning, and problem-solving"); Pheobe C. Ellsworth, Levels of Thought and Levels of Emotion,
in THE NATURE OF EMOTION, supra note 146, at 192, 193 (explaining cognition's competing definitions as
"sensory information processing" and "conscious propositional analysis").
152. See Jeffrey A. Gray, Framework for a Taxonomy of Psychiatric Disorder, in EMOTIONS: ESSAYS ON
EMOTION THEORY, supra note 144, at 29, 30 (explaining there is no brain structure "implicated in the control of
emotional behavior that has not been implicated also in a variety of perceptual, cognitive, and motor functions");
VAN GoozEN ET AL., Preface, in EMOTIONS: ESSAYS ON EMOTION THEORY, supra note 144, at viii ("One of the
liveliest debates in the field of emotions is the relation between affect and cognition. Some hold that affect
determines cognition, others that cognition determines affect.").
153. See, e.g., ANDREW ORTONY Er AL., THE COGNrIVE STRUCTURE OF EMOTIONS (1988); Jennifer S. Beer et
al., Frontal Lobe Contributions to Executive Control of Cognitive and Social Behavior, in THE COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCES II 1091, 1095, 1101 (Michael S. Gazzaniga et al. eds., 2004) (describing the orbitofrontal cortex
as the synthesizer of emotion). One sense in which this is thought to be so is that emotions are "about" objects in
the world. See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS (2001).
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we gain a more sophisticated understanding of their interrelatedness. 154 Referring
to cognition and emotion as separate-as thinking and feeling-remains so
common in both scientific and colloquial conversation that it retains communicative value. Moreover, as discussed below, emotion has unique influences that
cannot be accounted for, either theoretically or practically, with cognitive tests.
Historically, to the very limited extent that emotion has been considered within
decision-making theory it has been regarded solely as a distorting factor whose
presence disrupts rationality.15 5 This disparaging attitude has been particularly
influential within law, in which passion traditionally is cast as the enemy of
reason.156 Certain aspects of emotional experience unquestionably can distort
rational decision-making; scholars have largely legitimated the folk wisdom,
reflected in numerous areas of legal doctrine, that emotion can be a powerful and
sometimes disruptive force. 57 However, recent developments in emotion theory
have made clear that emotion also can play a positive role.1 58 Indeed, in recent
years a number of legal theorists have drawn on emotion theory to assert that
"emotion in concert with cognition leads to truer perception and, ultimately, to
better (more accurate, more moral, more just) decisions."' 59 Negative and positive
perspectives-both grounded fundamentally in the realization that emotion cannot
be eliminated but instead should be better understood-are equally important to60an
examination of emotion's influence on competence-relevant decision-making. 1

154. See LeDoux, supranote 151, at 220-23 ("Knowing these differences sets the stage for examining the links
between the systems.").
155. See Clore, supra note 150, at 1151 ("Along tradition, stretching from classical philosophy to the present,
views passion as the enemy of reason."); Isen & Labroo, supra note 143, at 366 (explaining that under the
(formerly) popular analogy between cognitive processing and the running of a computer program, "affect was
conceptualized as an 'interrupt' or disruption in an otherwise goal-directed program"); Bruce E. Kaufman,
EmotionalArousalas a Source of Bounded Rationality, 38 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 135, 139 (1999) (arguing that
increasing levels of emotion cause rational decision-making ability to deteriorate); Erin Ryan, The Discourse
Beneath: Emotional Epistemology in Legal Deliberation and Negotiation, 10 HARv. NEGOT. L. RaV. 231, 234
(2005) (asserting that lawyers are "resistant to the idea that their reasoning should ever be 'clouded' by emotion").
156. See Maroney, supra note 146, at 120 ("A core presumption underlying modem legality is that reason and
emotion are different beasts entirely: they belong to separate spheres of human existence; the sphere of law admits
only of reason; and vigilant policing is required to keep emotion from creeping in where it does not belong.").
157. Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 142, at 107 (arguing certain events trigger "emotion programs in which
the desire to attempt certain actions should be overwhelming, to the point where the actions are experienced as
compulsory," and that phenomenon receives cultural recognition in the law of "crimes of passion") (citation
omitted).
158. See Charland, supra note 84, at 359 ("[I]n addition to their negative role, emotions also have a positive
Preface, in EMOTIONS: ESSAYS ON EMOTION THEORY, supra note
role to play in competence."); Van Goozen et al.,
144, at x (explaining that contemporary "emotion theory views emotional impulses as in some way adaptive and
rational").
159. Susan A. Bandes, Introduction, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 1, 7, 11 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); see also
Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passionsof Criminal Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV.
655, 666 (1989) (critiquing the "myth of dispassion," which "rests on two fictions: (1) that emotion necessarily
leads to injustice, and (2) that a just decision maker is necessarily a dispassionate one").
160. See, e.g., Isen & Labroo, supra note 143, at 367 (arguing the "realization that affect is a regular part of
thought processes and motivation or processing goals" prompts more "realistic and complex" science).
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Most importantly for the purposes of this Article, emotion has a significant
influence on the decision-making model proposed in the preceding Part.161 This is
because emotion represents an important mechanism for the perception and
processing of information, one that captures different information than would
cognition alone. 162 Emotion also affects the perceived value, personal relevance,
or attractiveness of the information being processed, and therefore will shape
motivation and goals. 16 3 These impacts of emotion may be specifically mapped on
to the four previously described stages of decision-making.
First, emotion can influence both which stimuli are perceived and how they are
perceived.' 64 This is first seen through the mechanism of attention. Because
emotionally salient stimuli tend to be the ones of greatest significance to one's
thriving, they will be attended to disproportionately. 65 Thus, one without recourse
to emotion's guidance will find herself largely unable to sort effectively among the
nearly infinite competitors for her attention. Once a stimulus is attended to,
emotion continues to have an influence. For example, a fearful person might
believe that the shadow of a tree is that of a man wielding a knife, where others
would not perceive such an aggression. 166 In such a case, while the common
tendency is to describe the distortion as residing in what the person "thought she
saw," it may also reside one stage earlier: the emotion has shaped both "what she
saw" and what she "thought she saw." Extremes of emotion may also influence
perceptual recall. In acute cases of trauma, for instance, persons might become
unable to recall the emotionally powerful incident, or instead may recall it so
vividly and frequently that other information is kept out of accessible memory.167
Thus, the emotional salience of stimuli can substantially affect attention to, as well
as perception and memory of, both those stimuli and emotionally nonsalient

161. See Svenson, supra note 143, at 297 (explaining that emotion's influence on decision-making may be
procedural or representational).
162. See Ryan, supra note 155, at 232 ("[W]ithout the information gleaned from the emotional sense that
imbues human interaction and institutions with meaning, our world would seem reduced to hollow shells and
randomly-acting forms.").
163. See, e.g., Robert Nozick, Emotions, in THE ExAMINED LIFE: PHtLOSOPHICAL MEDrrATIONs 87, 93 & n.*,
96-97 (1990) (arguing emotions provide a "picture of value," as a type of "analog recording to language's digital
picture of events," and thus represents a different way of knowing); Clore, supra note 150, at 1164 ("[A]ffect
serves as information" and "provides information about value.").
164. See Gray, supranote 152, at 30 ("At the level of perception, the detection and interpretation of stimuli are
known to be deeply influenced by emotional state.").
165. See, e.g., Finucane et al., supra note 143, at 347 ("[M]uch research by social, clinical, and physiological
psychologists demonstrates that mood and emotion can direct attention toward or away from particular features in
the environment.") (citation omitted).
166. See, e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 142, at 104 (discussing perceptual mechanisms and how fear
alters them).
167. See RICHARD S. LAZARUs, EMOTION AND ADAPTATION 17 (1991) ("When a person is in a traumatic

situation, perception and thought may be impaired, blocked, distracted, even paralyzed."); Cosmides & Tooby,
supra note 142, at 111 (describing phenomenon among rape victims of experiencing prolonged period of time in
which images of attack dominate).
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stimuli.
Emotion also has a strong influence at the understanding stage. Different
emotional states are associated with distinct information-processing modes; 6 8 for
example, studies have suggested that persons in whom a "sad mood" has been
evoked process information more slowly but possibly more accurately than
"neutrals," while those in a "happy mood" tend to process information more
quickly but with a lower level of accuracy.' 69 But from the perspective of
competence assessment, perhaps the most significant contribution of emotion to
this stage of decision-making is through "appraisal" and "appreciation." Intimately
tied to emotional salience, appraisal and appreciation are interdependent aspects of
understanding that concern awareness of personal significance. Appraisal describes a "lighting-fast" judgment as to whether and how particular stimuli matter
to one's well-being and goals,' a judgment that will then shape information
processing. 17l
72
Intact appraisal leads to emotional reactions to personally relevant stimuli.'
Such appraisal and the attending emotion then contribute heavily to the specific
understanding, or appreciation, that information presented to (and decisions
required of) a person are applicable to her and carry consequences for her personal
situation. 73 For example, a defendant may understand that the death penalty is a
potential consequence of her prosecution. To say that she cannot appreciate that
fact would mean that she literally does not think it applies to her-for example,
because she believes that she is immortal-or that she realizes that it applies, but
does not attach to that realization any emotional significance. Without apprecia-

168. This area of research is one of overlap between thinking and reasoning; it is discussed primarily under the
rubric of the latter.
169. Daniel C. Molden & E. Tory Higgins, Motivated Thinking, in THE CAMBRmGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING

AND REASONING, supra note 92, at 295, 311.
170. Clore, supranote 150, at 1154 ("[S]uch evaluations are core features of the resulting emotions."); see also
LAZARUS, supra note 167, at 151-52:
Very rapidly, perhaps even simultaneously, we draw on a variety of stored information about the
environment, person variables, and their relational meaning .... [W]e must indeed automatically
do something similar to what I have described, or else the emotion process would not be adaptive
and our emotional lives would be much more chaotic than they are.
171. LAZARUS, supranote 167, at 144, 145, 149-51 ("Although knowledge is the cold cognitive stuff of which
personal meaning is made, it is not an appraisal with its personal heat until the implications for personal
well-being have been drawn.") (citation omitted).
172. See Gray, supranote 152, at 30 ("[A]t the cognitive level, it is widely accepted that appraisal of a stimulus
(e.g., as threat or promise) plays a vital role in the initiation of the appropriate emotional state .... "); Izard, supra
note 150, at 206 (arguing that appraisal depends on memories of our experiences).
173. Charland, supra note 84, at 362; PoYTHlREss ET AL., supranote 2, at 63-64 ("Unlike understanding, which
reflects comprehension at a more general and abstract level (i.e., how the legal system is supposed to work),
appreciation relates to a defendant's beliefs about how legal actors and processes will play out in his or her own
case."); cf Appelbaum, supra note 33, at 381 ("Since appreciation and appraisal rest on similar cognitive abilities,
it is probably not correct to say that one requires the other, so much as to say that impairment of one function is
likely to be accompanied by impairment of the other.").
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tion, a defendant lacks Dusky "rational understanding."'' 74 This is largely because a
person without appreciation does not have access to the fear, hope, or other
emotional reactions to relevant information
that normally would guide personally
75
consequential decision-making.
Reasoning also will be influenced by emotion states. For example, one exposed
to a negative feeling (e.g., fear evoked by recalling the sighting of a snake)
generally will report an increased (and likely inaccurate) estimation of the
likelihood of future occurrence of events that, though completely unrelated, may
provoke the same negative feeling (e.g., a terrorist attack).' 76 That reasoning
process likely would be quite different were the subject to have entered the
probabilistic exercise with a different affective prior. However, the mechanisms by
which emotion influences reasoning remain contested. Research has suggested, for
example, that persons in a positive mood disproportionately draw inferences
consistent with maintenance of positive mood. 177 Other researchers, however,
argue that positive affect can be shown to make reasoning "more efficient and
more thorough, as long as the task is one that is meaningful, interesting, or
important to the decision maker."' 17 8 To simplify a complex area, emotion's
influence on reasoning is highly contextual.
Finally, emotion can profoundly influence choice, including its communication
and implementation. The person described above, inordinately fearful of terrorist
attack, might make specific choices (e.g., engaging in increased risk avoidance) on
the basis of her affectively driven reasoning. Emotion-driven choice can also be far
more primal. Feeling-states predispose the actor to particular behavioral responsesanger, for example, is highly associated with risk-taking behavior and aggression,
fear with risk avoidance and escape, and disgust with avoidance and with-

174. POYTHRESS ET AL., supra note 2, at 63-64. In the first iteration of failed appreciation, where the defendant
believes she is immortal, the competence defect is caused by delusional thinking, a manifestation of thought
disorder. See supra Part I.C. It is this form of appreciation, not the affective element, to which the MacArthur
researchers primarily direct their inquiry.
175. See Charland, supra note 84, at 362-63, 370. In the thought-disorder iteration, the effect on emotion is
secondary: the delusional thought prevents access to the emotional reaction that would obtain were the cognitive
assessment accurate. In the second iteration, the effect is primary: the person lacks ability to generate the
emotional response at all, even given an accurate cognitive trigger.
176. See, e.g., Fessler et al., supra note 150, at 108 (discussing Johnson and Tversky's "affective generalization hypothesis").
177. See, e.g., Robyn A. LeBouef & Eldar B. Shafir, Decision Making, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
THINKING AND REASONING, supra note 92, at 243, 258 (arguing that emotions can influence the momentary
evaluation of outcomes and choice). But see Fessler et al., supra note 150, at 108 (discussing contrary evidence).
178. Isen & Labroo, supra note 143, at 377. "[Tlhere is now growing evidence that positive affect promotes
both efficient and thorough problem solving and generally enhances cognitive ability and processes." Id. at 383
(citation omitted). "[P]ositive affect has a substantial facilitating impact on organization of thought, cognitive
flexibility and elaboration, evaluation of evidence, negotiation tactics and responsiveness, variety-seeking and
risk-taking propensities, and the efficiency and thoroughness of decision strategies." Id. at 387.
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drawal. 179 Some emotional experiences-notably fear-appear to be nearly automatic responses to certain types of stimuli, with the result that they (and the
outward behaviors with which they are associated, such as freezing, running, or
striking out) are experienced as involuntary, or at least very difficult to override
cognitively. 180 It also has been suggested that extreme emotional instability causes
inability to maintain a consistent choice preference.' 8 ' Ability to communicate a
choice may also be impaired-for example, a person who firmly wishes to obtain a
divorce may feel unable to say so (and be thus frustrated in realizing his goal)
because of intense fear of public exposure to shame for having failed in his
marriage.
As the above discussion reveals, a very significant movement within the mind
sciences-one that is increasingly reflected in legal theory t82-asserts that, not
only is emotion not the natural enemy of rationality, 183 it is intimately connected to
the perception and processing of information, appraisal of value, formation of
goals, motivation of behavior, and implementation of choice. 184 Emotion can be a
strong force contributing to rational thought by marking particular stimuli as
meaningful and generating a sense of personal relevance and value that will shape
goals and motivations. Thus, a lack of emotion where one normally would expect
it to be present can deprive the decision-maker of vital information and guidance.
Emotion can also be disruptive, in that it may derail optimal perception, understanding, reasoning, and communication, or may override one's otherwise preferred
choices. While emotion and cognition are deeply intertwined, the influence of the
former cannot always be seen or accounted for by reference only to the latter.
A complete account of the decisional competence component of Dusky rationality therefore demands close attention to the positive and negative contributions of

179. See, e.g., Fessler et al., supranote 150, at 109-10 (drawing on the work of, inter alia, Fridja and Lazarus);
see also Cosmides & Tooby, supranote 142, at 107 ("Specific acts and courses of action will be more available as
responses in some states than in others, and more likely to be implemented.").
180. See LEDoux, supranote 1, at 143-45 (discussing conditioned fear learning); see also Elizabeth A. Phelps
et al., Intact Performanceon an Indirect Measure of Race Bias FollowingAmygdala Damage,41 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 203, 203-04 (2003) (stating that fear responses of the amygdala are "automatic and not dependent on
conscious, control processes").
181. See LeBouef & Shafir, supra note 177, at 258 ("Emotion and affect ... influence people's preferences;
however, because these sentiments are often transient, such influence contributes to reversals of preferences ... ").
182. See Maroney, supra note 146, at 121-23 (discussing the increase in research from the 1970s through
today).
183. See Clore, supra note 150, at 1152 (arguing that emotions are both operational tools that contribute to
rationality and feedback mechanisms that "tell us whether we have chosen rationally"); Slovic, supranote 148, at
990 (claiming that emotion and the "affect heuristic" enable us "to be rational actors in many important situations.
But not in all situations. It works beautifully in some circumstances and fails miserably in others. The law must
learn to tell the difference.").
184. See, e.g., Finucane et al., supra note 143, at 343 (stating that an "affect heuristic" guides decisions,
particularly "when the required judgment is complex or mental resources are limited").
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both cognition and emotion. 185 Because adjudicative competence is concerned
with radical departures from minimal norms of rational decision-making, we must
think carefully about the sorts of emotional dysfunction that might take a
defendant so far outside these norms as to be declared unfit to determine her own
fate within a criminal proceeding. That is the project of the following Section.
B. Emotional Disorderand Rational Decision-Making

We previously have explored the intimate relationship between cognition and
emotion in human decision-making, and in the preceding Part we saw how some
courts have begun to delineate how certain defects in cognitive processes might
undermine adjudicative competence. A similar effort is possible with regard to
emotional dysfunction. However, no such effort has been undertaken to date.
This is not to say that emotion is never discussed at all in connection with
adjudicative competence. Indeed, the case law occasionally surrenders small hints
that emotion is considered at least marginally relevant. 186 Milton Dusky, for
example, apparently experienced "emotional turmoil," as well as "depression,
feelings of inadequacy and unworthiness," and Richard Allen Moran was described as depressed and wracked by remorse and guilt. 187 The significance of
these emotional and mood states was never explained, but they were for some
reason considered worthy of mention.1 88 Similarly, commentators and forensic
theorists sometimes, in passing, mention emotion-states as a potentially relevant
consideration. 189 One (now quite outdated and likely seldom used) standardized

185. See Svenson, supra note 143, at 321 (claiming consideration of affect "opens possibilities for a deeper
understanding of decision processes").
186. In one reported case a court found a defendant incompetent to stand trial because "he did not emotionally
appreciate his peril sufficiently to assist his legal counsel in defense of the charge filed against him," though the
higher court later overturned that ruling after finding that the defendant was in remission and his unusual
emotional expression and inappropriate affect could be explained to the jury. State v. Gwaltney, 468 P.2d 433,434
(Wash. 1970) (finding that the defendant "was afflicted with the emotional disease of schizophrenia").
187. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 410 (1993); Dusky v. United States, 271 F.2d 385, 388 (8th Cir. 1959),
rev'd, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam); see also Bonnie, supra note 18, at 587 (discussing Moran's depression
and remorse).
188. See Strickland v. Francis, 738 F.2d 1542, 1548-49 & nn.12, 14 (lth Cir. 1984) (discussing the
psychiatrist's explanation of how anxiety affects rational thought processes and relevance of emotional content of
examinee's speech); Moore v. United States, 464 F.2d 663, 665 (9th Cir. 1972) (noting that the defendant had
"mood swings" and "deep-seated emotional problems of long duration"); Wilcoxson v. State, 22 S.W.3d 289,
307-08 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (finding that the defendant "'has been diseased emotionally and socially all of his
life,"' is "'[elmotionally immature"' and "'emotional[ly] labile,"' and has "'elevated affect"' and depressive
components to his hallucinations).
189. See, e.g., Bonnie, supranote 18, at 573 ("Problems in appreciating the situation and its consequences may
arise due to limitations in cognitive capacity, to disturbances of thought, or to affective disorders."); Burt &
Morris, supra note 11, at 92 (discussing the possibility that courts might "provide treatment opportunities to any
defendant whose emotional stability and consequent trial competency could be improved"); Viljoen et al., supra
note 101, at 24 ("Within Canadian law, a broad number of mental disorders can be used as bases for finding a
defendant unfit, such as psychotic, affective, cognitive, personality, and substance abuse disorders.") (citation
omitted).
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forensic assessment instrument incorporated a direct 190
measure of a defendant's
"ability to deal emotionally with the criminal process."'
However, while it seems that from time to time scholars, examiners, and courts
regard emotion as somehow relevant to adjudicative competence, there is no
operative theory as to why or how this is so.' 9' There certainly are few indications
that emotion is thought to be relevant because its intact functioning is critical to
rational decision-making. Indeed, given the very long history of rationality being
explicitly opposed to emotion and the extremely recent genesis of research and
scholarship challenging that opposition, 1 92 there is every reason to believe that
when courts, examiners, and commentators have spoken of rational understanding
they have understood it to have nothing do to with emotion-or even to refer to the
utter absence of emotional influence.
The following Subsections propose two situations in which emotion ought
properly to be considered in determinations of adjudicative competence. The first
is that of defendants with psychiatric illnesses, particularly severe clinical depression, that can impair the accurate perception and processing of decision-relevant
information, derail formation of self-protective motivation, and impair stable,
self-interested choice. In these cases, we may be concerned about a lack of
emotional balance, as well as the damaging influence of a surfeit of particular
emotions, such as grief and despair, and a dearth of others, such as joy or hope.
The second is that of defendants with neurological defects, usually caused by brain
damage, that impair perception, processing, and expression of emotion in a manner
that appears to disrupt rational decision-making. Here, our concern stems from a
general lack of emotion. 193

190. GRisso, supra note 13, at 132 (assessing the 1973 Competence Screening Test (CST)). As Grisso noted,
measurement constructs and legal criteria do not correspond perfectly, as the CST judged "understanding of the
consequences of the proceedings" with a measure of "'ability to deal emotionally.'... Thus the legal construct is
cognitive, whereas the measurement construct refers to an affective component." Id. at 132-33. However, Grisso
mused that measures of affective and coping skills could relate to any of the Dusky components. Id.
191. Cf. SANFORD H. KADIsH & STEPHEN J. ScHULiOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND

MATERIALS 912-14 (7t h ed. 2001) (citing cases on psychopaths and "affective insanity," including UnitedStates. v.
Currens,290 F2d 751, 761-63 (3d Cir. 1961)).
192. See supra Part II.A.
193. This distinction between "organic" brain disease and psychiatric disease is firmly entrenched in the theory
and practice of both law and medicine, but it is anything but a hard distinction, and its validity is increasingly
under attack. See, e.g., DSM-IV-TR, supra note 99, at xxx-xxxi, 181. For example, Antonio Damasio asserts that:
[t]he distinction between diseases of 'brain' and 'mind,' between 'neurological' problems and
'psychological' or 'psychiatric' ones, is an unfortunate cultural inheritance that permeates society
and medicine. It reflects a basic ignorance of the relation between brain and mind. Diseases of the
brain are seen as tragedies visited on people who cannot be blamed for their condition, while
diseases of the mind, especially those that affect conduct and emotion, are seen as social
inconveniences for which sufferers have much to answer.
ANToNIo DAMASiO, DEscARTEs' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON AND THE HuMAN BRAtN 40 (1994).
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1. Mood Disorderand Dusky-Relevant EmotionalDysfunction
A defendant's competence may be threatened by mood disorder, a term
encompassing a range of mental illness but generally used to signify either
"unipolar" or "bipolar" depression. 194 Unipolar depression captures the cluster of
symptoms most commonly associated with depression: loss of interest in or
pleasure from most activities; feelings of worthlessness, guilt, and despair; change
(usually a retardation) in motor activity; decreased energy; difficulty thinking,
concentrating, or making decisions; and, frequently, thoughts of suicide.1 95 Depression also may incorporate manic episodes, periods associated with an unusually
elevated mood (such as euphoria), psychomotor agitation, inflated self-esteem and
grandiosity, pressured speech, and poor judgment.196 A person in whom major
depressive episodes and manic episodes alternate generally will be diagnosed as
suffering from "bipolar" disorder, or what is referred to colloquially as "manic
depression." 197 Some manifestations of these disorders are relatively short-lived or
can have but minor effects on functioning.' 9 8 While such manifestations might
have some impact on rational decision-making-for example, were a defendant
required to make a very consequential choice while in the midst of a severe but
short-term depressive or manic episode-competence generally is liable to be
seriously threatened only by more severe and persistent manifestations, particularly where latitude is given for choices to be postponed until a short-term episode
has passed.'

99

The effects of severe clinical depression on, inter alia, attention, perception,
concentration, and memory are well-recognized in the clinical literature, and any
one of these effects could derail one or more of the stages of competence-relevant
decision-making.2 ° ° On the perceptive level, the severely depressed may focus so
disproportionately on mood-congruent stimuli as to neglect important contrary
information. For example, such persons may ponder or commit suicide out of "a
desire to give up in the face of perceived insurmountable obstacles or an intense
wish to end an excruciatingly painful emotional state that is perceived by the
194. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 99, at 345-46.
195. See id. at 349-50, 369 (defining Major Depressive Episode and Major Depressive Disorder).
196. See id. at 357-59 (defining Manic Episode).
197. An extremely rapid and temporally compressed switching between depressive and manic symptoms may
be characterized as a "mixed episode." Id. at 362-63, 382-83 (defining Mixed Episode and Bipolar I Disorder).
See generally KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, AN UNQUIET MIND: A MEMOIR OF MOODS AND MADNESS (1995)
(recounting the personal history of a professor of psychiatry's struggle with manic-depressive illness).
198. See, e.g., DSM-IV-TR, supra note 99, at 376-77, 381-82 (noting that Dysthymic Disorder or Depressive
Disorder Not Otherwise Specified may not entail serious functional deficits); id. at 365 (explaining that a
Hypomanic Episode may be of brief duration).
199. See, e.g., id. at 349 (stating that a Major Depressive Episode will have "clinically significant ...
impairment[s] in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning").
200. See generally DSM-IV-TR, supra note 99, at 345-428; 2 KAPLAN & SADocK'S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK
OF PSYCHIATRY 1338-77 (Benjamin J. Sadock & Virginia A. Sadock eds., 7th ed. 2000); SEVERE DEPRESSIVE
DISORDERS (Leon Grunhaus & John F. Greden eds., 1994).
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person to be without end," though a non-depressed person might perceive other,
more hopeful, facts and possibilities. 20 Depression-linked perceptive and understanding deficits may become so severe as to incorporate delusions, hallucinations,
and other symptoms characteristic of thought disorder. For example, the depressed
may develop feelings of "worthlessness or guilt.., of delusional proportions (e.g.,
a person who is convinced that he or she is personally responsible for world
poverty). 2 0 2 Moreover, depression appears to significantly derail normal appreciation, preventing formation of self-interested motivation. A severely depressed
person may be capable of accurately grasping the factual parameters of her
situation and options but report simply not caring about what the correct course of
action might be or how it might hinder or further her personal well-being.20 3 Even
if the depressed person does care about risk, the normal direction of such caring
may be reversed: she may want to take undue risks and may choose a clearly
self-harming outcome. 204
Nor are major depressive episodes the only culprits: the mania associated with
bipolar depression also can profoundly distort perception, understanding, reasoning, and choice. In terms of perception and understanding, manic persons generally
will be highly distractible and unable to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant stimuli and thoughts. Those experiencing mania often will exhibit disturbances of thought form, such as extremely fast, pressured, tangential, and even
nonsensical speech, as well as of thought content, such as "[g]randiose delusions"
as to their personal power and importance.20 5 On the level of reasoning, the manic

201. DSM-IV-TR, supranote 99, at 351.
202. Id. at 350; see generally JAMISON, supra note 197 (describing psychotic aspects of author's manic
episodes).
203. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 410-11, 417 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explaining that
Moran's remorse and guilt might have made him "inclined to exert less effort towards his own defense," as he
reported the he "really didn't care about anything" at the time of trial, leading him to a "self-destructive
'choice'). This connection has been discussed, albeit in a quite limited fashion, within the literature on
competence to consent to medical treatment and experimentation. See Carl Elliot, Caring About Risks: Are
Severely DepressedPatients Competent to Consent to Research?, 54 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 113, 114 (1997)
(discussing patients who do not care about the risks of possible courses of treatment and may even seek out the
risky treatments). In a very preliminary exploration of the subject, a team of researchers suggested that depressed
and manic persons display distorted premises when making personally relevant decisions under conditions of
uncertainty. See Harold J. Bursztajn et al., Beyond Cognition: The Role of Disordered Affective States in
Impairing Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 BuLL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 383, 383-85 (1991)
("[T]he extant models" for judging such competence "have tended to emphasize cognitive processes as the sole
elements of competence. The role of affect and of affective disorders in impairing competence has been
scanted.").
204. See Elliot, supra note 203, at 115.
205. DSM-IV-TR, supranote 99, at 357. Bipolar depressives in whom thought disorder plays a prominent role
may be diagnosed as suffering from either a mood disorder with psychotic features or schizoaffective disorder.
See id. at 319-23. For an empirical analysis of competence cases in which affective disorder and psychoticism are
presented together, see Viljoen et al.,
supra note 101, at 28, 33-34 (finding "significant correlations between
depression and impaired understanding and between withdrawal and impaired reasoning on the MacCAT-CA for
defendants with psychotic disorders"; another study "found that conceptual disorganization and delusional
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are prone to overestimate wildly their personal abilities and chances of success in
difficult situations. Further, persons experiencing mania are prone to impulsive and
imprudent choices, often in service of seeking immediate pleasure and gratification.2 °6 The extreme lability of affect associated with mania also can occasion
frequent
and dramatic changes of course, obviating decision-making consisten7
cy.

20

Despite these dramatic effects, the academic literature and case law generally do
not reflect any significant examination of the effects of depression, whether
unipolar or bipolar, on adjudicative competence. 20 8 However, because mooddisordered defendants present with some regularity, so too do these issues. Perhaps
because of the lack of a strong theoretical exploration of mood disorder in this
context, the case law reflects a highly confused attitude as to its relevance.
On the one hand, depression is sufficiently well recognized (and its effects
potentially so devastating) that courts sometimes take note of it,20 9 and sometimes
rely on it to support incompetence findings. In Drope v. Missouri, for example, the
Supreme Court found that while a recent suicide attempt did not per se signal
incompetence, it was highly relevant to whether a competence inquiry was
required, presumably because it provides some indication of serious depression.2 10
More recent cases reflect a similar acknowledgment that depression is relevant,
though there is no particular consensus as to how or explanation of why. 2 11 This

thinking had a stronger impact on legal abilities in defendants with affective disorders than those with
schizophrenia"); see also Steven K. Hoge et al., The MacArthur Adjudicative Competence Study: Diagnosis,
Psychopathology, and Competence-Related Abilities, 15 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 329, 337 & tbl.1, 340-43 & tbl.6
(1997).
206. For example, the DSM-IV-TR states that those experiencing manic episodes
may be hostile and physically threatening to others. Some individuals, especially those with
psychotic features, may become physically assaultive or suicidal. Adverse consequences of a
Manic Episode (e.g., involuntary hospitalization, difficulties with the law, or serious financial
difficulties) often result from poor judgment and hyperactivity.
DSM-1V-TR, supranote 99, at 359.
207. See id. at 357.
208. As previously noted, such issues sometimes are mentioned in passing. See, e.g., Bonnie, supra note 18, at
575 (explaining that a decision may be non-delusional but nonetheless be "powerfully influenced by delusional
beliefs or pathological emotions ....Organic deficits, retardation, psychotic thought disorder, delirium and
dementia, extreme phobia or panic, anxiety, euphoria and depression may impair a defendant's capacity to weigh
information in order to make rational choices, consistent with starting premises and assigned values."); see also
Welsh S. White, Defendants Who Elect Execution, 48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 853, 873-75 (1987) (discussing defendants'
desire for self-destruction but not examining its effect on adjudicative competence). It is also possible that,
because certain specific manifestations of depression can include psychosis, those particular manifestations might
be captured by a Lafferty-like test. However, the non-psychotic manifestations will not be.
209. See supranotes 187-88 (citing depression in Dusky, Drope, Godinez, and Wilcoxson).
210. 420 U.S. 162, 179-80 (1975).
211. See, e.g.,
Liles v. Saffle, 945 F2d 333, 339 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that the defendant's history of mental
illness was enough to require the court to hire a psychiatrist to help him with his defense); United States v. Mason,
935 F. Supp. 745 (W.D.N.C. 1996) (denying the defendant's claim that, because he attempted suicide after his last
conviction, he had been incompetent to be tried).
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was the case in State v. Holland, in which the Supreme Court of Utah relied on the
defendant's bipolar mood disorder to reverse a trial court's finding of competence
and remand for a hearing. 21 2 Though the court did not explain why manic
depression signaled possible incompetence, it seemed irritated with the trial court
for relying heavily on its assessment of Holland as "articulate," suggesting that it
may have found the trial court's test overly cognitive.2 13 On the other hand, courts
also-and perhaps more frequently-dismiss the import of depression in a manner
that reflects a strong privileging of cognition.21 4
Indeed, the dissenting judge in Holland focused on the defendant's lack of
evident thought disorder, apparently regarding affective disorder to be irrelevant. 2 ' Depression's negation of self-protective motivation often has met with a
similarly dismissive attitude. For example, in United States v. Rivera, two
court-appointed experts agreed that the defendant suffered from clinical depression and was highly unmotivated to assist in his defense.21 6 The court nonetheless
found him competent, crediting testimony from one expert that Rivera had "the
ability to effectively communicate with his attorney and to assist in the planning of
his defense but simply chooses not to do so,', 217 and rejecting contrary evidence
that "depression prevents the defendant from being motivated enough to communi212. 921 P.2d 430, 436 (Utah 1996). An expert testified on an earlier remand that Holland "'suffered from a
mental illness that is known as bipolar disorder with mixed features,"' or "manic depressive illness," and that he
had been incompetent "due to 'impulsivity, poor judgment, and the suicidality [sic] that he expressed at the
time."' Id. at 434.
213. id. at 435. Oddly, the court apparently considered Holland's mood disorder relevant only to the "ability to
consult with counsel" prong of Dusky. Id. at 435-36.
214. See, e.g, Rivers v. Turner, 874 F.2d 771, 773-74 (11 th Cir. 1989) (finding that no inquiry by counsel was
warranted despite repeated and recent suicide attempts and psychiatric treatment, as defendant could communicate with counsel, understand defense strategy, and respond appropriately to questions); United States v. Pappert,
45 F. Supp.2d 1231, 1235-36 (D. Kan. 1999) (explaining that a history of hospitalization is not sufficient to
overcome the impression of the defendant as "lucid and rational"); Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 395 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999) (holding that hospital treatment for depression did not per se require a competency hearing);
Collier v. State, 959 S.W.2d 621, 624-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (finding that the testimony of defendant's
psychiatrist that defendant had major depressive order, but was "rational, of average intelligence, and competent,"
was not sufficient to require the trial court to conduct a competency hearing); Myers v. State, No. 06-04-00033CR, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS, at *3-5 (Tex. App. Oct. 5, 2004) (finding that evidence that the defendant had a long
history of bipolar disorder and hospitalization did not indicate a "severe mental illness" requiring further inquiry,
particularly in light of his factual understanding of the case and "rational dialogue" with counsel).
215. Holland, 921 P.2d at 438 (Howe, J., dissenting) (stating that Holland-who denied depression and
suicidal ideation-appeared to understand the consequences of his decisions, and was not "out of touch" in the
Lafferty sense but instead "was always well rooted in reality").
216. No. 90 CR 1001-1, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 349 (N.D. Il1.Jan. 12, 1995). Rivera initially had been deemed
incompetent and unlikely to be restored to competency in the foreseeable future; he was committed on the basis of
dangerousness. After a period of treatment he was again examined for competency; those evaluations were the
subject of the instant opinion. Both experts found that Rivera suffered from, inter alia, "a major affective disorder"
and was "depressed." Id. at *8, 12.
217. Id. at *9, 14. One expert believed that Rivera, at least in part because of his depression, saw no point to
cooperating in his defense. Id. at *10 & n.2. However, he also believed that he was competent because his
depression was not "severe enough to impair his ability to participate in the proceedings or to understand the legal
consequences of the proceedings." Id.
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cate with his attorneys. '218 It then recounted apparently "rational" behavior, such
as speaking coherently, as further evidence of Rivera's competence. 2 19 The court
appeared to believe that depressed persons could be motivated to care about their
fate if they chose to be so motivated.2 2 ° In addition to being tautological, such
reasoning signals a fundamental disregard of the role of emotion-dependent
appreciation and motivation within rational decision-making.
The tension between these attitudes as to the impact of depression is perhaps
most clearly seen in the very thorny context of execution volunteer cases. Because
competent defendants are free to decide whether to challenge a lawfully imposed
punishment, death row inmates generally will be presumed able to acquiesce to
execution; 22 but because such acquiescence may spring from suicidal depression,
purported best friends often come forward to try to prevent what they consider a
suicide by execution.2 22

218. Id. at *13. The defense expert also believed that Rivera exhibited "a type of psychosis, manifesting itself
in magical or delusional thinking," a finding the court rejected. However, the court also made clear that this
expert's major reason for finding Rivera incompetent was not psychosis but rather the depression that prevented
him from caring enough to take self-protective action. Id. at *12-13.
219. Id. at *15; cf Commonwealth v. Goodreau, 813 N.E.2d 465, 473 (Mass. 2004) (taking seriously the
import of defendant's depression and self-harming goals, but ultimately upholding the competence finding).
220. See United States v. Landsman, 366 F. Supp. 1027, 1029-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding that the depressed
defendant was competent despite his "expressed lack of will to assist his defense" because he had the "ability" to
so choose); cf Goodreau, 813 N.E.2d at 343, 352-53 (citing defendant's "intellectual capabilities" and concluding
that, despite his later claims that depression blocked self-protective motivation and led to his guilty plea, nothing
had been "preventing counsel from developing a defense"); North Carolina v. Avery, 337 S.E.2d 786, 790 (N.C.
1985) (citing expert testimony that the removed portion of the defendant's frontal lobes controlled "affect and
mood but has no significant effect on memory," such that the defendant appeared to "ha[ve] chosen not to
remember the events of the allegations").
221. These cases are governed by the "rational choice" rule of Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314 (1966), which
post-Godinez likely has the same meaning as Dusky rational understanding. See supraPart I.A.
222. See, e.g., Smith v. Armontrout, 865 F.2d 1502 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that defendant's waiver of appeals
was valid); State v. Passaro, 567 S.E.2d 862, 865 n.9 (S.C. 2002) (citing statistics that 12% of executions from
1993-1995 were the result of waived appeals); State v. Sagastegui, 954 P.2d 1311, 1322 (Wash. 1998) (holding
that the court must stick to a prior competency ruling despite pleas from next friends for a hearing). To be sure, so
long as the United States has a system of capital punishment, there must be some circumstances under which a
death-row inmate competently may choose to forgo the fight for her life. In some situations a person may have not
just logical but sound reasons for wanting to end life, and respect for individual autonomy dictates that inmates
enjoy the same right as others to make such a choice. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)
(holding that competent persons have a right to refuse life-saving treatment); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997)
(same). But clearly the situation is altered where the death is to come not from disease or a reasoned decision to
abandon treatment but instead by state-ordered execution; and in any right-to-die context the possible impact of
affective disorder should be robustly considered. See OR. REV. STAT. §127.825 (2003) ("No medication to end a
patient's life in a humane and dignified manner shall be prescribed until the person performing the counseling
determines that the patient is not suffering from a psychiatric or psychological disorder or depression causing
impaired judgment."). For an exploration of the issues raised by execution volunteers and a proposed test for
distinguishing between inmates whose choice not to fight execution is permissible and those for whom the choice
should be disallowed as suicidally motivated, see John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: Volunteers, Suicide, and
Competency, 103 MIcH. L. REv. 939 (2005).
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It appears that, in this battle, confusion reigns supreme2 2 3 but that a disproportionate focus on cognitive abilities is winning. This certainly was the case in
Rumbaugh v. Procunier.24 Two forensic examiners agreed that Rumbaugh was
"profoundly depressed" and that such depression substantially affected "his
capacity in the premises" on which his decisions were reached, and might "act as a
coercive force and impair[] his ability to exercise free will to make a decision. 2 25
They nonetheless concluded that he was competent to exercise rational choice
because he understood his position and was able to "think coherently" and reason
"logically." 22 6 The Fifth Circuit, though recognizing the challenge of determining
what "rational" might mean in such circumstances, noted that Rumbaugh had filed
"an extremely coherent and well-reasoned pro se state habeas corpus petition" and
upheld the finding of competence because Rumbaugh's decision to end his life was
227
"logical," given the intense suffering caused by his depression.
As with the majority opinion in Rivera, the Rumbaugh majority's approach fails
to give adequate consideration to the disabling effects of depression. As the
dissenting judge in Rumbaugh correctly argued, the majority opinion rested on a
limited and largely cognition-driven standard of rationality, erroneously equating

223. Consider the long and hotly contested battle over whether Michael Ross was competent to abandon
challenges to his 2005 execution by the State of Connecticut. Ross for years attempted to be put to death-indeed,
after his original death sentence was overturned, he had sought unsuccessfully to stipulate to the death penalty,
which was then reimposed after a new hearing-but a series of purported next friends argued that his desire to die
was caused by the depression associated with "death row syndrome." A District Court first credited expert
testimony that Ross' decision was "driven by suicidal despair, rather than an exercise of free will." Ross v. Lantz,
No. 05-CV-116(RNC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 908, at *8 (D. Conn. January 25, 2005). However, Ross eventually
was found competent and executed. See Ross ex rel. Dunham v. Lantz, 408 F.3d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 544
U.S. 1028 (2005).
224. 753 F.2d 395,398 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub noma.Rumbaugh v. McCotter, 473 U.S. 919 (1985).
225. Id. at 399, 400.
226. Id. at 397-402. At the hearing, Rumbaugh (apparently to make clear that he had affirmatively chosen to
die) lunged at a court officer with a hand-made weapon and commanded the officer to shoot him; he was indeed
shot, though he did not die. Id. at 397; see also Rumbaugh v. Estelle, 558 F. Supp. 651, 653-54 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
While Rumbaugh was being taken to a hospital, one expert testified that the incident supported his conclusion that
Rumbaugh's decision to die was rational. See Rumbaugh, 753 F.2d at 397.
227. Rumbaugh, 753 F.2d at 402.
Rumbaugh is able to feed relevant facts into a rational decision-making process and come to a
reasoned decision ... [o]ne of the facts is that Rumbaugh is mentally ill, he has severe depression,
with no hope of successful treatment, which would reduce his current mental discomfort to a
tolerable level .... [His] assessment of his legal and medical situations, and the options available
to him, are reasonable[, though] if the medical situation vis-a-vis treatment were different,
Rumbaugh might reach a different decision about continuing judicial proceedings. In other words,
Rumbaugh's disease influences his decision because it is the source of mental pain which
contributes to his invitation of death.
Id. The court refused to conclude "as a matter of law that a person who finds his life situation intolerable and who
welcomes an end to the life experience is necessarily legally incompetent to forgo further legal proceedings which
might extend that experience." Id. at 403.
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"rational' with logical.1 228 On the majority's view, "a person's cognition, his
understanding, is deemed tantamount to an ability to choose rationally., 229 Such a
result displays a lack of respect for the vital contributions of emotion, particularly
through the mechanisms of appraisal and appreciation, to rational decisionmaking.
A similarly dismissive attitude often attends the impact of depression on choice.
Consider Smith v. Armontrout, in which the Eighth Circuit deemed competent a
severely depressed defendant who had over the course of his imprisonment
changed his mind as to whether to pursue or abandon appeals at least ten times.23 °
The dissenters urged careful attention to the destabilizing effects of depression
with its "frequent mood changes 2 3 and "unstable and self-destructive tendencies. 23 2 Though such lability is a common aspect of depression, particularly the
bipolar sort, the majority without significant elaboration deemed Smith capable of
choosing to "suffer the consequences of' his crime and declined to order a new
evaluation.2 3 3 Armontrout does not appear to be an outlier case. While inability to
maintain a consistent choice may be seen by courts as irritating or threatening to
finality, it seldom is considered as an indicator of possible adjudicative incompetence.
Thus, the cases reveal a very real and persistent disagreement over the
appropriate level of consideration to be given to affective disorder, particularly
clinical depression, when determining adjudicative competence. Even those examiners and courts that think depression relevant appear to lack an articulated theory
as to why. And, unfortunately, the general resolution of that debate reflects
simplistic notions of decision-making, consisting of nothing more than intact
cognition plus the powers of deductive reasoning.

228. Id. at 404 (Goldberg, J., dissenting); see also Rumbaugh, 558 F. Supp. at 653 (relating expert's testimony
that Rumbaugh's decision was "rational or at least logical"). Judge Goldberg's arguments were echoed by Justices
Marshall and Brennan in a dissent from the denial of certiorari. See Rumbaugh v. McCotter, 473 U.S. 919, 919
(1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Though Judge Goldberg argued that Rees "rational choice" competence was
quite different from Dusky "rational understanding" competence and that Rumbaugh would have been Duskycompetent, the case was decided before Godinez, and such comments no longer have persuasive force. See
Rumbaugh, 753 F.2d at 411-12.
229. Rumbaugh, 753 F.2d at 409.
230. 865 F.2d 1502, 1503-06 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc); see also id. at 1512 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
231. Id. at 1513 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 1511 (Lay, C.J., dissenting). The dissenters quoted the following testimony of forensic examiners:
Now, a problem there for me is on the rational side. In the past some courts have interpreted that as
an affective component that's a lot more subjective .... [I]t's a fuzzy area. I'm not sure that person
who is facing death, who is condemned to die, who experiences hopelessness anyway, who does
have some lack in social skills, in terms of coping skills, I'm not sure that that allows a person to be
'fully rational.' I don't know what the standard is or what the ideal is there.
Id. at 1509. "He's cognitively aware. I don't know how emotionally aware he is." Id.
233. Id. at 1507.
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2. Brain Damage and Dusky-Relevant Emotional Dysfunction
Another manifestation of emotional dysfunction relevant to competent decisionmaking is that attending certain forms of brain damage, particularly to regions of
the frontal lobes. The emotional deficits associated with such brain damage appear
to be highly correlated with persistent inability to make self-protective choices in
situations of risk to one's own thriving, despite retention of cognitive capacity.
Though such disorder almost certainly is less common than clinical depression,
these cases now are beginning to surface and their proper resolution promises to be
hotly contested.
Evidence of concurrent emotion-and-reasoning deficits attending brain damage
is found in the cognitive neuroscience literature-particularly (but by no means
exclusively) the work of Antonio Damasio 2 34-and is grounded in the story of the
most famous neurological patient in history, Phineas Gage.23 5 In 1848, Gage
survived a railroad-construction accident in which an iron rod was propelled at
high speed through his head. Amazingly, he remained conscious and appeared to
recover with nothing more than disinfectant and bandages. His miraculous
recovery, however, was elusive. It was only a matter of time before all who knew
him concluded "'Gage was no longer Gage.' 236 Whereas before he had been
polite, prudent, and hard working, he became impatient, foul-mouthed, and prone
to fits of rage. Though still intelligent and skilled, Gage became unable to keep a
job; in fact, as his doctor recalled, "he was good at 'always finding something
which did not suit him"' and appeared to have become incapable of planning or
238
forethought. 237 He became transient and died penniless 13 years later.
The Gage case led to a number of fundamental insights animating the modem
neurosciences, including that "a lesion of circumscribed areas of the brain could
cause the loss of very specific mental or nervous functions in humans." 239 Further,

234. See, e.g., DAMASIo, DESCARTES' ERROR, supra note 193. Other important work on the role of emotion in
decision-making has been pursued by, inter alia, Edmund Rolls. See, e.g., EDMUND T. ROLLS, THE BRAIN AND
EMOTION (1999).
235. An account of the Gage case may be found in DAMAsIo, DESCARTES' ERROR, supranote 193, at 3-33; see
also MICHAEL S.GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE MIND 537-39 (2d ed. 2002);
Michael S. Gazzaniga & Megan S. Steven, Free Will in the Twenty-First Century: A Discussion of Neuroscience
and the Law, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 51, 59-62 (Brent Garland
ed., 2004).
236. GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 235, at 539.
237. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR, supra note 193, at 9, 11 (quoting Dr. John Harlow, who memorialized his
interactions with Gage in John M. Harlow, Passage of an Iron Rod Through the Head, 39 BOSTON MED. &
SURGICAL J. 389 (1848-49)).
238. See DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR, supra note 193, at 9-10.
239. John T. Cacioppo & Gary G. Berntson, Social Neuroscience, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES Ill, supra
note 153, at 977 (citation omitted). Of course, few patients suffer brain injury because of metal rods like Gage's
tamping iron; bullets to the head are far more common in modem life. See, e.g., State v. Shytle, 374 S.E.2d 573,
574 (N.C. 1989) (evaluating the expert's argument that the self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head impaired the
defendant's emotional responses); State v. Avery, 337 S.E.2d 786, 790 (N.C. 1985) (explaining that the defendant
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that the "new Gage" lacked emotional regulation and became unable to plan for (or
execute action toward) a stable future suggested that such abilities might be both
intertwined and dependent on the brain areas damaged in the accident.2 40 Though
many brain areas now have been shown to be involved with emotional perception,
processing, regulation, and expression, 24 ' damage to the ventromedial portions of
prefrontal cortex-the areas damaged in Gage 242-has been shown to interfere
with "social and emotional competence while not affecting cognitive competence
in other domains., 24 3 It therefore is to these areas-and to prefrontal cortex 244
more generally-that researchers have looked for an intersection between emotion
and decision-making.
In Descartes' Error Damasio describes clinical evidence of what he dubbed a
"Gage matrix" of disabilities attending frontal lobe damage. His most detailed
description is of a patient known as "Elliot," whom Damasio styled as a
"modem-day Phineas Gage." Following surgery for a brain tumor in which
portions of his frontal lobes were removed, Elliot went on a downward spirallosing jobs, squandering money on suspect investment schemes, and alienating

shot himself through the head and portions of the frontal lobes were thus removed). Other causes also abound.
"Damage to the frontal lobes can be caused by a myriad of insults, including direct trauma, vascular lesions,
infectious, degenerative and metabolic processes." G. Michelle Reid-Proctor et al., Evaluation of Legal
Competency in Patients with FrontalLobe Injury, 15 BRAIN INJuRy 377, 381 (2001); see also Pate v. Robinson,
383 U.S. 375, 378, 381 (1966) (explaining that defendant was hit on the head by a brick as a child and later shot
himself in the head).
240. GAZZANIGA ET AL., CoGNrVE NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 235, at 533-39 (arguing that cases like that of
Gage demonstrate that we
need to understand how emotion and motivation influence our ability to process information and
choose actions ....Although he showed no obvious impairment in his intelligence and perceptual
or motor abilities, he was no longer able to evaluate appropriately the significance of events and
regulate his emotional responses.)
Id. at 538.
241. The brain areas most obviously implicated in emotion are the amygdala, hippocampus, orbitofrontal
cortex, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. See GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNIVE NEUROsciENCE, supra note 235, at
545-46, 553 (discussing the role each of those areas plays in emotion); Heatherton et al.,
Introduction:Emotion
and Social Neuroscience, in THE CoGNITIVE NEUtROSCmNcEs Il,supra note 153, at 973, 974 (explaining the role
of the amygdala and the hippocampus). For definitions and descriptions of these and other brain areas, see
GAZZANIGA E-r
AL., CoGNmvE NEuRoscENcE, supranote 235, at 62-95. The effect of damage to emotion-relevant
brain areas on competence, and on decision-making generally, is a promising site of future research, both
scientific and legal.
242. GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEuRoscmNcE, supra note 235, at 538. This research was made possible by
the remarkable fact that Gage was buried with his tamping rod, and Dr. Harlow had his body exhumed and
retained both the rod and Gage's skull. These were examined nearly a century later by Hanna Damasio and
colleagues, who used computer simulation techniques to recreate the trajectory of the rod through Gage's brain.
See Hanna Damasio et al., The Return of Phineas Gage: The Skull of a Famous Patient Yields Clues About the
Brain, 264 ScrENcE 1102 (1994).
243. Heatherton et al.,
supra note 241, at 974.
244. Prefrontal cortex is the most evolutionarily "new" portion of the human brain and is thought to be critical
to "higher" brain functions, including reasoning and executive control. See e.g., GAZZANIGA Er AL., COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 235, at 75.
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family members-that eventually resulted in inability to support himself.24 5
Examinations revealed that Elliot was intelligent, had intact cognitive abilities, and
displayed normal knowledge of ethics, social conventions, and moral value. On
two measures of functioning, though, he was highly abnormal. First, Elliot was
emotionally flat. He was able to recognize and describe the emotional salience of
stimuli, such as pictures of gruesome injuries, but displayed no normal physiological reactions to such stimuli. 246 Second, he displayed a profound dissociation

between "real-life failure and laboratory normalcy" in making choices.24 7 In
laboratory conditions, he was able to solve hypothetical problems as well or better
than most, but in his personal life, he continuously made disastrous choices in the
face of clear warning signals, resulting in the loss of virtually all his assets and
social supports. 248 Damasio reports having examined twelve other patients with
similar brain damage: each displayed the same "combination of decision-making
defect and flat emotion and feeling," leading him to conclude that "[t]he powers of
reason and the experience of emotion decline together," and that "their impairment
stands out in a neuropsychological profile within which basic attention, memory,
intelligence and language appear so intact24 9that they could never be invoked to
explain the patients' failures in judgment.,
The clinical evidence of this precise correlation between emotional dysfunction
and impaired personal decision-making is limited-at least in part because brain
damage is often diffuse, meaning that persons with damage to ventromedial
prefrontal cortex often will have damage elsewhere, such that "Gage matrix"
symptoms may present as part of a larger and more varied set of disorders.2 5 0

245. DAMASio, DEscARTEs' ERROR, supranote 193, at 34-37. Though this issue is not discussed by Damasio in
detail, it signals another area of the law to which such emotional dysfunction could be relevant: that of entitlement
to disability benefits. Because of Elliot's cognitive intactness, he initially was denied benefits; after Damasio's
investigation, he was granted benefits.
246. Id. at 45 (characterizing this emotionally flat state as "to know but not tofeer) (emphasis in original).
247. Id. at 46.
248. Id. at41-50.
249. Id. at 53-54. Those with prefrontal damage "cannot generate emotions relative to the images conjured up
by certain categories of situation and stimuli, and thus cannot have the ensuing feeling," but can experience
primary emotions (such as instinctive fear) and thus may appear to have intact affect in some situations. Id. at
138-39. This clarification is important, as it can explain Gage's "fits of rage" and account for the fact that even
persons like Elliot are capable of sometimes experiencing and expressing some emotion. It would be very strange
for literally all emotional capacity to be eliminated, as there is no single center of emotion center in the brain.
According to Damasio, individual expression of "Gage matrix" impairment will vary-for example, according
to the stage of life at which the individual's brain damage occurred. However, he believes these persons share a
common core of impairments, including being "[r]igid and perseverant in their approach to life" and unable to
organize their lives and futures; displaying stereotyped mannerisms; and having diminished experience of
pleasure and pain. Such patients will also display normal intelligence and a lack of motor, sensory, or
communication defects. Id. at 58.
250. For example, persons with damage to various regions of the frontal lobes may have broad impairments to
what is called "executive function" or "executive control." Executive function refers to a cluster of high-level
brain functions "which orchestrate relatively simple ideas, movements, or actions into complex goal-directed
behavior."' Laurence B. McCullough et al., Implications of Impaired Executive Control Functionsfor Patient
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Moreover, Damasio's account of why emotion and reasoning are so intertwined is
contested within cognitive neuroscience. 251 His theory, rooted in what he calls the
"somatic marker hypothesis," appears directed primarily to appraisal, appreciation, and choice: lack of emotion, he has proposed, might prevent these persons
"from assigning different values to different options," making their "decisionmaking landscape hopelessly flat" or, perhaps, "too shifty and unsustained" to
support sound and consistent choices.2 52 Whether this account is correct remains
to be rigorously tested. But regardless of debates as to the nature of underlying
mechanisms, it is now accepted that brain damage affecting emotional perception,
processing, and expression-particularly damage to the frontal cortices-is correlated with diminished rationality, particularly in the realm of highly personal
decision-making. 3

This research has at least three important implications for assessments of
adjudicative competence. First, persons with specific forms of frontal lobe damage
might with some regularity become defendants, as their extreme decision-making
deficits may lead to poor choices (and, in rare cases, disinhibited and aggressive
behaviors) with criminal consequences. 2 54 If this is so, it is particularly important

Autonomy and SurrogateDecision Making, 12 J. CLINICAL ETmIcs 397, 398 (2001) (citing T. Shallice, Specific
Impairments of Planning, 298 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc. B: BIoLoGIcAL ScL 199 (1982)) (arguing that

impairment to executive control caused by, inter alia, depression, brain trauma, or psychosis can cause "apathy
and impairment of goal directed thinking; reduced emotional control resulting in marked personality changes...
and diminished ability to engage in abstract thinking"); see also Reid-Proctor et al., supra note 239, at 381
(discussing personality changes that may accompany frontal lobe injuries).
251. See, e.g., Beer et al., supra note 153, at 1095-98 (presenting three competing theories).
252. D mAsio,DEscARTEs' ERROR, supra note 193, at 52-53. Damasio also theorized that Elliot's decisionmaking "defect appeared to set in at the late stages of reasoning, close to or at the point at which choice making or
response selection must occur." Id. at 50-51.
253. See, e.g., GAZZANIGA ET AL., CoGNrlvE NEuRoSCIECE, supra note 235, at 547 ("The orbitofrontal cortex
seems to be especially important for processing, evaluating, and filtering social and emotional information. The
result is that damage to this region impairs the ability to make decisions that require feedback from social or
emotional cues."); see also id. at 553 ("[T]he orbitofrontal cortex must rely on learned information about the
emotional qualities of stimuli in order to assess the utility of our actions."); Laurence R. Tancredi, Neuroscience
Developments and the Law, in NEuROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 235, at 71, 87-88 (discussing different

research on brain damage and its effects on emotion and reason). Damasio asserts that while it is true that
"uncontrolled or misdirected emotion can be a major source of irrational behavior," "[rieduction in emotion may
constitute an equally important source of irrational behavior." D m'sio, DEsCARTEs' ERROR, supra note 193, at
52-53.
Damasio's theory of a "Gage matrix" also is supported by research on deficits among anosognosiacs, persons
with right-hemisphere cortical damage who suffer obvious left-side motor defects (such as paralysis) but who fail
consciously to recognize their affliction. Anosognistics have flattened emotion and feeling. They are similar to
frontal-damage patients in terms of highly impaired decision making-but unlike frontal patients they are
obviously disabled and thus are likely shielded from many opportunities to make bad decisions. Because "patients
with prefrontal lesions appear neurologically normal," they "can engage in a variety of social interactions that will
easily expose their defective reasoning." Id. at 67.
254. See, e.g., Reid-Proctor et al., supranote 239, at 381 ("Involvement with the legal system may especially
be likely if pre-morbid antisocial, histrionic or narcissistic personality features are intensified following frontal
lobe injury."); see also GAZZANIGA ET AL., CoNmrYE NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 235, at 550 (arguing while these
patients generally are "more hurtful to themselves than others," some with orbitofrontal damage might also
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that adjudicative competence doctrine have a theory as to how such persons should
be regarded. Second, such persons may exhibit intact cognitive abilities and yet be
incapable of the kind of high-stakes, highly personal decision-making required of
criminal defendants, and that inability will present together with-and perhaps be
caused by-severe impairment in ability to experience and express emotion. In
these cases, failure to consider impaired emotional capacity might lead to an
erroneous finding of competence, either because deadened emotion is not recognized as a clue leading to further inquiry that might uncover brain damage,25 5 or
because of imposition of an overly cognitive test in which the emotion and
decision-making deficits, even if proven, are dismissed as irrelevant.2 56 Third,
other brain-damaged persons (for example, those with more diffuse sites of injury)
may display the above-described impairments as well as cognitive and motor
deficits. In these cases, the danger of false negative might be lower; but as
competence determinations look to the combined effects of impairments, failure to
take seriously those going to emotion and personal decision-making could remove
important information from the calculus.
These issues are novel, and to date are scarcely reflected in the case law.
However, to the limited extent that they have been addressed they have met with
inconsistent results.
Consider the case of "Jane," a prominent member of society with a long and
impressive record of educational and professional accomplishments and philan5 Unbeknownst to her, she suffered from a congenital bloodthropic activities. 257
flow defect known as an arteriovenous malformation ("AVM"), located in the left
frontal lobe of her brain. Very late in her life, Jane began suddenly to engage in a
series of obviously foolish financial schemes, and experienced a downfall much
like that of Damasio's Elliot. She lost virtually all of her family's money, was sued
for financial improprieties, and eventually was convicted for minor participation in
what was revealed to be a fraudulent investment scheme. The brain damage was
discovered in the sentencing phase, after new defense counsel-seeking to
determine the cause of her sharp change in life circumstances and struck by her
odd emotional profile-arranged for psychiatric and developmental testing and,
exhibit antisocial behavior disorders and difficulties controlling violent or aggressive impulses). But see
Gazzaniga & Steven, supra note 235, at 62 (arguing that scientists may be overstating the link between brain
damage and antisocial behavior). The possibility of post-brain-damage involvement in crime is strongly
supported by the case of "Jane," discussed infra note 257 and accompanying text.
255. Such was the case with "Jane," a defendant whose case is discussed infra note 257 and accompanying
text.
256. Cf. Reid-Proctor et al., supra note 239, at 382 (noting that commonly used screening tests which focus on
memory or orientation may be relatively insensitive to deficits in executive functioning, making it easier for an
examiner to be misled regarding competency in patients suffering frontal lobe injury).
257. "Jane" is based on a former client of the author. Out of respect for that defendant's privacy and that of her
family, the author has chosen not to identify her or discuss her case in detail in this Article. All descriptions of Jane
and her situation are based on factual statements made in publicly filed documents in her case. Dr. Norman Relkin
was instrumental in helping the author master the science so as to understand Jane's illness and impairments.
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finally, a neurological exam and brain scan. The scan both showed the AVM and
revealed that at some point, likely quite late in Jane's life and probably shortly
before the start of her "downfall," the AVM had ruptured and bled. Extensive
neuropsychological testing then revealed that Jane retained her extremely high
intelligence and virtually all of her cognitive abilities, though she did display the
highly tangential and perseverative speech characteristic of a thought disorder.2 5 8
This general cognitive intactness had largely masked others' ability to recognize
her progressively more serious deficits. However, her affect was noticeably
constricted and she was consistently unable to make self-protective choices in
personal, particularly financial, matters. Significantly, she appeared utterly incapable of perceiving the mental instability of the fraud's ringleader and the
implausibility of her representations and promises, though those facts were
immediately evident to others. She also appeared strangely detached from the
extremely serious repercussions of her conviction for both her and her family. A
court-appointed expert, after considering the defense's evidence and examining
Jane, opined that she was incompetent to be sentenced.2 59
Jane's case would appear to be the first in which an examiner has explicitly
relied on evidence of a "Gage matrix" disorder to make a finding of adjudicative
incompetence. Other instances in which similar issues were raised have met with
very different outcomes, as decision-makers in those cases regarded evidence of
emotional dysfunction, even if presumed to be true, to be irrelevant.
The first such case is North Carolina v. Shytle.2 6 ° Wanda Graybeal Shytle shot
herself in the head after killing a number of family members. Expert examinations
conducted after her self-inflicted injury indicated that while her intelligence and
memory were intact, the significant damage to Shytle's brain "impaired her
emotional response[s] to situations" and led to inappropriate behavior, such as
laughing at serious moments, that suggested that she failed to grasp the seriousness
of her plight.2 61 One examiner testified that she was incompetent because "her
affective appreciation of events has been lost," preventing her from "understanding her legal situation and cooperating with her attorney., 2 62 The North Carolina
Supreme Court was asked whether, "if an individual's cognitive, reasoning ability
is separated from basic emotional responses or affect," she would be "competent

258. Jane's speech disorders also appeared linked to brain damage, in that scarring from the AVM rupture
extended into areas connected with production of language. While others had noticed her increasingly bizarre
speech, it appears to have been written off because she was getting older and perhaps more "quirky." She was also
a speaker of English as a foreign language, a factor that may have impeded some persons' ability to discern that
her speech had become disordered.
259. The evidence of Jane's previously undiscovered brain damage also raised significant issues as to her legal
responsibility for the conduct of conviction. For a variety of reasons not relevant to this discussion, that issue has
not been and likely never will be litigated.
260. 374 S.E.2d 573 (N.C. 1989).
261. Id. at 574.
262. Id.
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not only to aid in [her] defense but also to proceed to trial.

2 63

Two trial judges, without significant discussion, determined that she was
competent, and the North Carolina Supreme Court agreed:
There was evidence that the defendant had an IQ within the normal range and
that she knew what the charges were and what could happen to her if she was
convicted. If this did not worry or upset her because of her altered medical
condition, it does not mean that she did not understand those facts .... If the
defendant's
situation did not bother her it does not mean she did not compre2 64
hend it.

This analysis-in which the extreme abnormality of Shytle's lack of emotional
reaction to her potentially dire situation was sanitized by the presence of bare
intellectual understanding-ignores the importance of appreciation in shaping
self-protective motivations and goals.26 5 In Shytle, then, cognitive function simply
trumped emotional dysfunction, without a considered effort to determine how the
latter might have affected rationality.
Similar evidence met with a similar disposition in the recent clemency petition
of Donald Beardslee, executed in 2005 for taking part in a multiple murder to
avenge a small debt.2 66 Though the issue argued there was not competency but,
rather, potential mitigation providing a reason to spare his life, the way in which
the brain-damage arguments were treated is relevant and illuminating.2 67 In an

263. Id. at 575.
264. Id. at 576. Recall that apparently being "unbothered" by the very serious ramifications of her criminal
case was also a symptom exhibited by Jane, and was one of the attributes that most troubled defense counsel and
led to further investigation of her impairment.
265. See id. at 575 (holding that as long as a defendant can converse with her attorney and understand the
discussion, she is competent). Even if the behavioral expression of Shytle's apparent affective disorder was not
considered relevant to competence, it likely should have been considered relevant to whether her appearance to a
jury would deprive her of a fair trial. See, e.g., Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179, 185 (2003) (stating that the
Constitution allows the involuntary administration of "antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing
serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial" only if their administration is
unlikely to cause side effects, such as a diminished "ability to express emotions," that undermine the fairness of
the trial); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 138 (1991) (stating the possibility that defendant's medication caused
side effects that could have affected the defendant's outward appearance, testimony, ability to follow the trial, or
ability to communicate with counsel); see also id. at 142-44 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing how drugs may
unfairly alter a defendant's "emotional responses"); note 267, infra (raising similar issues with regard to Donald
Beardslee and "Jane").
266. See, e.g., Bob Egelko et al., DonaldBeardsleeExecuted; KillerPut to Deathat San Quentin, S.F. CHRON.,
Jan. 19, 2005, at Al.
267. Not only was Beardslee's purported brain injury relevant to his conduct, in that it might, if adequately
substantiated, have suggested that he responded to the chaotic and stressful circumstances of the crime with
confusion and panic, leading him to imitate the actions of his co-defendants, but it might also have explained
imposition of the death penalty, as his "constricted emotional range was likely to be viewed" by the jury "as
indicating aloofness, indifference or even callousness." Decl. of Rubin C. Gur, Ph.D., Ex. 51 in Support of
Petition for Executive Clemency, Donald J. Beardslee l1-12, at 5-6 (Dec. 30, 2004) (on file with author)
(hereinafter "Gur Declaration"). Similarly, Jane's relatively flat affect could make her appear "cold," and the
prosecutor repeatedly expressed frustration with what he considered her lack of remorse. Further, it was reported
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eleventh-hour bid for clemency, Beardslee's attorneys came forward with new
evidence suggesting that he had brain damage-present at birth and aggravated by
two head injuries in adulthood, one of which resulted in coma-that, among other
deficits, impaired emotional capacity.2 68 According to a defense expert and family
members, throughout his life Beardslee appeared unable appropriately to express
when
emotion, was unusually gullible and naive, and exhibited terrible judgment
269
uncertainty.
and
stress
of
conditions
under
decisions
personal
making
In a response closely paralleling that in the Shytle case, prosecutors offered a
purely cognitive theory: Beardslee could not be seriously brain-damaged, at least
not in a legally meaningful way, because he had a relatively high IQ, welldeveloped cognitive skills, got good grades, had before his incarceration been
capable of caring for himself, and had a solid work history.270 To the extent that
Beardslee failed to show emotion, the state argued, that merely showed his lack of
remorse. The Governor of California, Arnold Schwarzenegger, agreed. While
acknowledging that the claim that brain injury left Beardslee "unable to process
emotions... warrant[ed] more extensive discussion," Schwarzenegger declined to
enter that discussion and instead concluded that Beardslee's apparently intact

to the author that several schoolchildren who observed part of her trial on a field trip were scared by Jane's vacant
demeanor and regarded her as "spooky." These concerns echo those expressed in Sell, 539 U.S. at 181, 185, and
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-44, with regard to the potential for psychotropic medication to alter a defendant's
emotional expression. But see State v. Gwaltney, 468 P.2d 433,434-35 (Wash. 1970) (holding that the defendant's
uncontrollably inappropriate emotional expression could be adequately explained to jury).
268. See generally Pet. for Executive Clemency, Donald J. Beardslee (Dec. 30, 2004) (on file with author).
According to that petition and the supporting materials, Beardslee showed early signs of brain damage and
throughout his life exhibited both abnormal emotional perception and expression and poor judgment. As a young
man he suffered head injuries in a car accident, and several years later was hospitalized with a skull fracture and
frontal lobe injury after being hit by a falling tree. Id.
269. According to Dr. Rubin Gur, likely damage to portions of Beardslee's right-hemisphere prefrontal cortex
significantly impaired his "ability to inhibit responses to cognitive and emotional stimuli," thus damaging his
ability to plan and engage in "reasoned, purposeful, self-controlled goal-directed behavior." Gur Declaration,
supra note 268, 8, at 3. See also Dean E. Murphy, Brain Damage Is Cited in Pleafor Killer's Life, N.Y. TIMEs,
Jan. 18, 2005, at A 14 (quoting Dr. Gur as testifying at clemency hearing, "He couldn't really understand people's
emotions .... He couldn't know himself how to behave, so he would rely on others to interpret things for him. He
would mimic people's behavior."). Beardslee's argued "impairments in the areas of emotional processing" were
consistent with his "stiff, emotionally constricted, relatively flat affect" and "poor ability to decipher emotional
cues." Gur Declaration, supranote 268, 10, at 4-5.
A very significant limitation on Dr. Gur's analysis was that he had not personally examined Beardslee, nor had
he access to any brain scans; he presented what he called a "behavioral image" of Beardslee's brain, a
computer-generated schematic representation of clinical data that essentially hypothesized what the brain
probably looked like. See id. 6, at 2. Therefore, one of the requests put forth by Beardslee's lawyers was that the
execution be stayed for the purpose of obtaining actual brain scans. That request was denied. In contrast, in Jane's
case the ability of the defense to access sophisticated brain-scanning technology and neuropsychological testing
yielded compelling evidence of her brain damage, its precise location, and its behavioral impact.
270. Letter of James P. Fox, District Attorney, et al. to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of California 7-8, 12
(Jan. 7, 2005) (on file with author). The prosecutor in Jane's case also repeatedly denied that she could be
significantly brain-damaged, primarily because of her intact intelligence.
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cognition answered the inquiry. 2 7' Though "many observers ha[d] reported that
Beardslee" had "a flattened affect for much of his life" and had argued that "this
lack of emotion [wa]s a symptom and byproduct of his mental deficiency,"
Schwarzenegger concluded that the fact that "Beardslee had a flat affect... does
not have persuasive value" showing that he lacked "capacity to make reasoned
decisions. 2 72 Beardslee was executed. 73
In both the Beardslee and Shytle cases, then, legal decision-makers held that
evidence of cognitive function simply overrides evidence of emotional dysfunction. The fact that these states of being can coexist-and, further, that emotional
dysfunction can correlate with and signal rational decision-making deficits even
where cognition is intact-was simply not considered credible. Nor did the
decision-makers in those cases appear to regard as important the fact that persons
with profoundly impaired emotional function might be incapable of formulating
the self-protective motivation that would animate active participation in their
defense, including cooperation with counsel. In contrast, in Jane's case an
examiner took such emotional impairments seriously, in conjunction with evidence of other (and arguably more cognitive) impairment, and determined her to
be adjudicatively incompetent. This juxtaposition, paralleling that of the courts'
and examiners' varying treatment of depression, indicates that current theory and
practice fail to reflect a consistent and sophisticated understanding of emotion's
influence on rational decision-making.
IHI. MEASUREMENT AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Thus far, this Article has argued that both cognition and emotion are integral to
the rational decision-making on which adjudicative competence depends. It has
urged that decisional competence be recognized as key, that examiners and
courts-whose interdependent efforts are vital to determinations of adjudicative
competence-undertake any given competence determination by reference to the
component parts of rational decision-making, and that such examination articulate
and take seriously the effects of both thought disorder and emotional disorder,
particularly where the latter is not adequately captured by a cognitive focus. It has
argued specifically that courts and examiners should consider whether clinical
depression (whether unipolar or bipolar) has impaired substantially a defendant's
perception, appreciation, and ability to choose, and that the emotional deficits
271. Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Statement of Decision: Request for Clemency by Mr. Donald J.
Beardslee 3 (Jan. 18, 2005) (on file with author).
272. Id. at 3-4. Thus, Beardslee's assertions were never tested; the Governor concluded that, even if verified,
the emotional deficits would be irrelevant.
273. Moreover, the Governor's decision, by relying on an assessment that Beardslee's impairments did not
prevent him from knowing right from wrong, see id. at 5, reflects a fundamental confusion between the legal
standards governing clemency and insanity, in a way that directly parallels the persistent confusion between
competence and insanity. This parallel suggests that decision-makers looking to competence might similarly
make decisions based on the incorrect standard.
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attending certain forms of brain damage should be regarded as important concomitants of impaired capacity for reasoning and choice. It is worth asking, though,
whether this proposal is amenable to implementation that would further the goals
of adjudicative competence doctrine. This Part addresses those concerns.
The question of whether emotional competence is amenable to accurate,
consistent definition and measurement is no small matter. This difficulty is not
unique to emotional considerations; because of the open-textured nature of the
construct, it inures to all attempts to define and measure competence.2 74 The real
question, then, is whether there is something about emotional disorder that makes
it so different from cognitive disorder as to prevent it from being articulated,
measured, and considered as part of the legal test for adjudicative competence.
While there is good reason to raise this question, it should be answered in the
negative.
One prominent competence theorist, Paul Appelbaum, raised just this question
within the context of a parallel debate over capacity to consent to medical
treatment. 275 Appelbaum agreed that "disturbing questions" had been raised
"about the lack of attention to emotional issues in competence assessment. ' 276 He
cautioned, however, that before incorporating emotional considerations we ought
to satisfy ourselves of the existence of a substantial target population whose
incompetence is not likely to be captured by more traditional cognitive measures,
as well as of the feasibility of measuring such dysfunction. Perhaps, he argued, the
historical focus on cognition at emotion's expense is warranted if it reflects "the
experience of the courts with regard to the major causes of decision-making
incapacity. '2 77 Thus, he asserted, "[i]t is imperative to know before beginning that
the game is worth the candle. 2 78 Appelbaum's concerns, which have not to date
been followed up within the consent-to-treatment literature, 279 are well placed,
though he almost certainly was wrong that historical neglect of emotion's role
might reflect the wisdom of experience. Such neglect is entirely consistent with
and reflective of the historical disregard of emotional considerations that is now
274. See ROESCH & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 101. The authors ask:
If competency is viewed as a construct, and if it cannot be reduced to a particular operational
definition, and if even court decisions themselves are (more or less) fallible, then how can one
proceed to improve the reliability and validity of assessment procedures used (or to be developed)
in its determination?
Id.
275. See Appelbaum, supra note 33.
276. Id. at 378; see also id. at 382-84 (noting that this is the case because emotion signals value and assists in
formulation of goals, and as brain-damage research suggests a strong link between emotion and reasoning) (citing
BECKY COX WHITE, COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 131, 137 (1994), and DAMAslO, DESCARTES' ERROR, supra note

193, at 38).
277. Id. at 386.
278. Id.
279. These questions represent a rich site for potential future research, ideally as a collaborative effort between
scientists and legal scholars.
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under sustained attack. 280 And if we look beyond that neglectful pedigree, the
outlook is hopeful.
The search for "rational" cognition is, after all, not so very different from the
search for "rational" emotion; as LeDoux has pointed out, "cognition is not as
logical as it was once thought and emotions are not so illogical," 2 8' and as to both
we operate with reference not to an ideal but to a rough account of the normal.28 2
Thinking and reasoning are not "inherently rational, optimal, desirable, or even
smart. A thorough history of human thinking will include quite a few chapters on
stupidity. '2 83 And as abundant research on bounded rationality 28 4 has confirmed,
people consistently exhibit normatively non-rational processes when forming
judgments and making decisions.285 While reliance on cognitive heuristics and
biases 286 is in one sense irrational, it cannot be the sort of irrationality about which
adjudicative competence is concerned, if for no other reason than that it is far too
common. 287 Similarly, the fact that most people are of only average intelligence
and routinely make foolish choices cannot be legally significant. But by buying
into the adjudicative competence requirement, we necessarily assume that we can
somehow, and with some level of consistency, tell the difference between everyday
288
irrationality and the competence-threatening sort.
Even when considering only cognitive function this is often far from an easy
call, as discussion of the thought-disorder cases reveals. But the quest for such

280. See supraPart II.B.
281. LEDoux, supra note 1, at 35.
282. Thanks to Liam Murphy for clarifying this point.
283. Holyoak & Morrison, supra note 92, at 2.
284. The notion of "bounded rationality," or the "intelligent use of one's limited cognitive resources," was
introduced by Herbert Simon. Goldstein & Hogarth, supra note 104, at 3, 13. Like the literature on decisionmaking generally, the literature on bounded rationality is vast, and this Article does not attempt to survey or
summarize it. See generally BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard
Selten eds., 2002); BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).

285. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, A Model of Heuristic Judgment, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF THINKING AND REASONING, supranote 92, at 267, 287 (discussing how people rely on heuristics and

biases to make judgments).
286. See Finucane et al., supra note 143, at 341, 343 (proposing the existence of an "affect heuristic").
287. Saks & Behnke, supra note 38, at 105, 115.
Our knowledge of the pervasive irrationality that governs decision making-indeed, that governs
all human activity-serves as a reason for extreme caution ....Even generally effective decision
makers who indisputably have the ability to form accurate beliefs misuse statistics, misunderstand
probabilities, and accord undue weight to vivid examples. They may also be profoundly affected
by irrational and unconscious factors. Unless we are willing to declare most people incompetent,
declaring only the mentally ill who lack reasoning skills incompetent risks unjustifiably discriminating against individuals on the basis of mental illness.
Id. at105.
288. This distinction roughly parallels that between ordinary cognitive limitation and mental retardation,
relevant to attributions of criminal responsibility and relative culpability. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 308-09 nn.3, 5 (2002) (discussing differences between normal or average cognitive function and that
displayed in persons with mental retardation).

1428

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1375

rationality is significantly furthered by the decision-making approach argued here.
Indeed, that approach is largely reflected in the forensic assessment instrument
created by the MacArthur team. 289Moewd
More widespread use of that instrument, the
MacCAT-CA, would promote clarity and consistency, at least in terms of assessing
cognitive disorder. Encouraging close articulation of the necessary steps of
decision-making-including by use of the MacCAT-CA-should not, though, be
read to imply that each step must be ideally executed for the entire process to be
deemed minimally rational.
A similar analysis pertains to emotional disorder. Though this Article has
explained how a dearth or surfeit of particular emotions, a general lack of
emotional capacity, or lack of emotional balance can threaten competence, that
does not signify that a defendant must have optimal emotional health to be
competent, just as she is not required to display above-average intelligence and
sharp, non-biased reasoning skills.2 90 Criminal defendants often will present with
emotional disturbances, only a small subset of which might threaten competence. 29 Defendants may well have had mood disorders and emotional problems
before committing the conduct of which they are accused; the offense conduct
might have been motivated by emotional disturbance or itself may have caused
trauma; and the prospect of conviction and punishment may trigger significant
stress and suffering.2 92 While these factors might matter to adjudicative competence in any given instance, they might not, though a prudent approach would

289. Forensic theorists have made significant strides toward articulating the substrates of adjudicative
competence and attempting to more consistently and "accurately" measure them. Though the earliest forensic
assessment instruments ("FAIs") were little more than simple checklists, newer ones are more detailed and
standardized. See G~isso, supra note 13, at 10-12. There is a large and rich literature explaining, evaluating, and
critiquing the various FAIs, an explication of which is beyond the project of this Article. See id. at 141-45. The
MacCAT-CA, theoretically based on the notion of decisional competence, is poised to become the "gold standard"
for assessments of adjudicative competence. But see id. at 140-4 1.
290. See, e.g., United States v. Landsman, 366 F. Supp. 1027, 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (explaining that the
defendant with an aneurism at the base of his left frontal lobe was:
not a well man, physically or mentally .... However, many people who are not well are legally
able to stand trial, and it is this Court's heavy burden to decide whether or not, in this instance, the
defendant's physical or emotional problems are so severe as to bar a substantial public interest in
the resolution by trial of a criminal indictment.)
291. This Article does not, for example, advocate imposition of a general concept of "emotional competence"
that is relevant to one's ability to lead a stable and happy life, such as that explored in CAROLYN SAAmN, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF EMOTIONAL COMPETENCE (1999).

292. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Goodreau, 813 N.E.2d 465, 473-74 (Mass. 2004) (remarking that depression
in the face of likely life imprisonment, and remorse and empathy for one's victims, are "eminently rational");
Nebraska v. Stooksbury, 2003 Neb. App. LEXIS 322, *13-14 (Neb. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 2003) ("Most people facing
the charges against Stooksbury would likely be less than overjoyed at the very real prospect of prison time; thus,
the fact that Stooksbury seemed depressed to his counsel is hardly surprising, but it does not rise to the level of
establishing incompetence."); Reedy v. Wright, 60 Va. Cir. 18, 43 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2002) (noting that while the
defendant may have been suicidal, "[it is also not self-evident that contemplation of suicide by a man on trial for
murdering his own 2-year-old and 4-year old children demonstrates legal incompetency").
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regard many such emotional disturbances as warranting further examination. What
we are concerned about is the presentation of extreme disorders that can be shown
to seriously disrupt one or more identifiable stages of minimally stable, selfprotective decision-making processes.
In this regard, examination of competence-threatening emotional disorder may
not be on quite as solid a footing as a cognitive approach. However, it still falls
well within acceptable limits. An example is illustrative. Consider the MacCATCA, which, as "primarily a cognitive assessment tool,"29' 3 is not well suited to an
assessment of emotion's role. For example, it contains only one indirect measure
of affect, the "appreciation subscale," but that subscale is not specifically directed
to the emotional component of appreciation, but rather to its thought-disorder
iteration.2 94 Moreover, the understanding and reasoning portions of the MacCAT-CA rely on the defendant's responses to a hypothetical incident, which by
reason of being "one step removed from the defendant's actual case ' 295 may be
particularly ill-suited to capturing "Gage matrix" dysfunction, in which intact
laboratory response to hypotheticals stands in contrast to real-life failure. 29 6 These
limitations suggest that the MacCAT-CA will be of little use in cases of emotional
dysfunction. But such a conclusion would be overstated. While a new instrument
could be developed to incorporate the types of emotional considerations urged
here, assessment of emotional competence need not await such a test. No forensic
assessment instrument is intended to stand alone, but instead is meant to be
considered as part of a holistic evaluation including clinical observation, review of
the defendant's medical and psychiatric history, interviews with those in a position
to shed light on her behavior, and evaluation of the particular issues and demands
at play in the specific case. 297 Thus, the MacCAT-CA could be supplemented with
a more emotion-focused inquiry were the examiner, defense attorney, prosecutor,

293. Pox'rmass ET AL., supra note 2, at 89.
294. PoYTHRss Er AL., THE MACARTHUR COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT TOOL-CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION: PROFESsIONAL MANUAL 13 (1999) (explaining that appreciation measures primarily are directed to delusional beliefs).
295. Zapf & Viljoen, supra note 13, at 360, 362 (characterizing this as the tool's main limitation).
296. See DAMAsio, DESCARTES' ERROR, supra note 193, at 50 (arguing that the dissociation could be due to
various laboratory realities: (1) no real need to make a decision, just to reason about one; (2) no continuing shifts
and changes in constraints and circumstances; the "ongoing, open-ended, uncertain evolution of real-life
situations was missing"). This is true more generally of patients with frontal lobe injury and deficits in executive
functioning, whose deficits are often difficult to detect with standard neuropsychological testing. See Reid-Proctor
et al., supra note 239, at 382 ("[T]he test taking environment is artificial; the examiner provides a great deal of
structure to the patient, which may mask the patient's difficulties with such issues as irritation, problem solving,
and self-direction.").
297. See PoYruas Er AL., supra note 2, at 89 (stating "no claim is made that" the MacCAT-CA "assesses
systematically all of the dimensions or issues potentially relevant to adjudicative competence"). That a

defendant's abilities must be examined in light of the specific demands of the particular criminal case is one on
which theorists uniformly agree. See, e.g., Winick, supra note 6, at 974 & nn.250-51. However, this is a common

point of failure in actual evaluations. See, e.g., id. at 973 ("Clinical evaluators applying the competency standard
rarely inquire into what skills are actually needed by a particular defendant in view of the plea or trial strategy his
counsel will follow.").
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or judge to suspect a relevant emotional disorder.
At least with regard to depression, such an examination is likely to be fruitful.
Clinical depression is a relatively well-understood disease affecting a large number
of persons. z98 While its definition and diagnosis always will be subject to
meaningful debate, this is equally true of schizophrenia and other psychotic
disorders. Moreover, as the cases demonstrate, the possible incompetence of such
persons is not always captured by cognitive tests. Capturing such impairments will
depend on whether emotional factors are explicitly considered relevant to the legal
standard. What is lacking is not a strong empirical foundation for depression
diagnoses; it is, rather, a strong theoretical foundation within law, such as that
offered herein, affirming that such depression might matter to competence, and
explaining how. If courts direct examiners to make such assessments, those
examiners have ready access to the diagnostic tools to comply.
The prognosis for assessment of "Gage matrix" disorder is more mixed. While it now
appears clear that emotional capacity and reasoning decline together in persons with
specific forms of frontal damage, causation remains unclear. Though causation is a
highly contested issue in the study of psychotic and mood disorders as well, the novelty
of the emerging brain research warrants particular caution when deciding whether to
attribute to it real legal significance. 2" It is also difficult to know how many people, let
alone how many criminal defendants, might be affected by such brain damage. There is
reason to believe they may be overrepresented in the defendant population.3 00 It has been
suggested, too, that a large percentage of death row inmates suffer from frontal lobe
damage, 30 1 and at least some of those may well display such disorder. But detection
issues loom large. The emotional flatness characteristic of "Gage matrix" disorder could
mimic the flat affect displayed by those considered "psychopaths" or even those
attempting, for reasons of ego maintenance or self-protection, to project a tough
image. 3" 2 Because of the high cost and uncertain payoff of brain imaging, in addition to

298. See generally KAPLAN & SADOCK'S COMPREHENSIVE TFXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 200, at

1652-61 (explaining the treatment of depression).
299. See Brent Garland, Future Directions,in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 235, at 44-47 (noting
consensus among lawyers and neuroscientists at a conference that "[flor the well-being of both" law and science
"the science must be presented, used, and discussed in a realistic and accurate fashion-one that reflects both the
limitations and the potentials of the science"). However, law should not be based on antiquated views that conflict
with modem science; if science has moved on but the law has not, the latter should try to catch up. Deborah
Denno, A Mind to Blame: New Views on InvoluntaryActs, 21 BEHAv. Sc. L. 601,603-04 (2003).
300. See supra p. 1420 & n.254.
301. See D. Michael Bitz & Jean Seipp Bitz, Incompetence in the Brain InjuredIndividual, 12 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 205, 247 (1999) (discussing a study that found head injuries "in 100% of death row inmates"); Michael
Sarapata et al., The Role of Head Injury in Cognitive Functioning,EmotionalAdjustment & CriminalBehavior,
12 BRAIN INJURY 821, 822 (1998) (explaining prior research indicating prevalence of brain damage in offenders).
302. Morse has suggested that "psychopaths" who lack capacity for empathy should be excused from criminal
responsibility. Morse, Rationalityand Responsibility, supra note 90, at 264. Note, however, that "psychopathy" is
not properly a mental health term, though some aspects of what is commonly meant by the term may be found in
the diagnostic classification for "antisocial personality disorder." DSM-IV-TR, supra note 99, at 701-03. Even
assuming this to be correct, is it not immediately apparent that a failure of empathy would have an impact on
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privacy concerns, it would be neither feasible or desirable to image all defendants' (or
even all capital defendants') brains, absent other strong indicators of incompetence or
brain injury.
Still, "Gage matrix" disorder should be allowed to inform competence assessment. In cases like Jane's, where a strange emotional profile-particularly one
incorporating highly unusual affective flatness and inability to "read" the emotional signals of others-presents together with a history of evidently selfdestructive behaviors, there is good reason to suspect such disorder. Because
cognition tends to remain intact in such persons, attention to the emotional aspect
will matter, because without it we are left with a purely outcome-driven inquiry:
we think the defendant may be incompetent because of the terrible choices she has
displayed in life. Such an assessment will fall far short of that required to trigger an
inquiry or justify an incompetence finding, and cognitive tests likely will reveal
nothing unusual. Following up on the suspicion created by the addition of apparent
emotional disorder, then, generally by neuropsychological examination and brain
imaging, may bring very important information to the table. The current state of
scientific knowledge permits a conclusion that such a profile is underlain by a
defective decision-making process, although we may not yet know precisely why.
The high correlation of emotion and reasoning defects suggests that the latter are
both substantial and not something over which the defendant has control. Thus,
even under the most cautious approach, presentation of such a profile should raise
a bona fide doubt as to competence sufficient to warrant more searching inquiry.3 °3
Whether any resulting evidence of brain damage should be considered to establish
Dusky incompetence will be a harder call, highly dependent on the exact nature of
the damage and the extent to which medical experts and courts are able to
articulate its effect on the defendant's ability to make sound, self-protective
decisions in the context of her case. 30 4 Given the limitations of existing standardized tests such a determination almost certainly will require creative solutions,
potentially including administration of the type of experimental gambling tasks
used by Damasio in his research,3 °5 observation of the defendant in actual
decision-making situations, and interviews of persons who have observed her
competence, as competence is concerned primarily with capacity for self-regard and self-protection; however, the
impulsivity associated with antisocial personality disorder might be relevant. Future research may shed light on
this question. See generally Christopher J. Patrick, Emotional Processes in Psychopathy, in VIOLENCE AND

PSYCHOPATHY 57 (2001) (discussing which characteristics of psychopaths lead them to criminal acts).
303. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966) (holding that where there is doubt as to the defendant's
competence, the judge must conduct a competency hearing). One form of relief requested by Beardslee, which
was denied, was a brain scan and further testing to substantiate his claims of brain injury and resultant emotional
deficits. See Governor Schwarzenegger's Statement of Decision, supra notes 271-73. Under the approach
advocated here, though applied in the very different context of a clemency determination, that request should have
been granted.
304. This analysis could apply equally to assessment of other forms of emotional impairment linked to brain
injury, not just to the specific sort described in this Article.
305. DAMAsIO, DESCARTES' ERROR, supra note 193, at 212-17.
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real-life decision-making processes.
Even once we have satisfied ourselves that we can incorporate emotional
evaluation into competence determinations, we still must ask ourselves if we
should. It is possible that fewer defendants will be deemed incompetent under the
proposed approach, because the effort might lead examiners away from simplistic
determinations-for example, those that de facto equate psychosis with incompetence-but it seems more likely to result in more-potentially many moreincompetence determinations, particularly of the severely depressed.3 °6 Because
of the doctrine's delicate balancing act between competing values, undue expansion of the test threatens to both impair defendants' autonomy and frustrate the
state's interest in public safety and law enforcement.
Structural features of the competence determination, however, largely guard
against any serious threat to autonomy and public safety. In nearly every case, the
consequence of an incompetence determination is not termination of criminal
proceedings: it is a delay in proceedings while the defendant is evaluated and
treated.3 °7 Extensive delay in proceedings surely can weaken a prosecution case,
but confinement for restoration of competence may not continue indefinitely and
must be justified by treatment progress, creating incentives for timely resolution.
Depression, even severe depression incorporating elements of thought disorder,
often is amenable to treatment, particularly with medication 3 0 8-and in very
extreme cases medical staff may be permitted to administer such medication
involuntarily. 30 9 The period of evaluation and treatment also is useful for detecting
malingering. 3 Further, even if the interest in enforcing criminal law never is
vindicated, the defendant might still be incapacitated, as should she be incapable of
competence restoration but dangerous to herself or others she will be subject to

306. This is, of course, an empirical question that warrants exploration.
307. Cf. Commonwealth v. Goodreau, 813 N.E.2d 465, 474-75 (Mass. 2004) (holding that the record
supported the finding that defendant's depression eased sufficiently during his confinement as to render him
competent because he was able to effectively communicate with his lawyer). On remand, Milton Dusky was

found competent because both medical examiners and his attorney found his condition much improved. Dusky v.
United States, 295 F.2d 743, 746 (8th Cir. 1961). Indeed, the vast majority of those referred for evaluation and
treatment are eventually ruled competent. See G~isso, supra note 13, at 70 (citing studies where only 10-30% of
those evaluated found incompetent); RoEscHt & GOLDING, supra note 6, at 29, 47-48 & tbl.3.1 (explaining that

incompetence rate of evaluees averaged 30% across ten studies, from a low of 4% to a high of 77%); Winick,
supra note 6, at 925 & nn.9-10 (stating that 25% of evaluees were deemed incompetent and subsequently
hospitalized). Some of these competence findings, though, would come out differently under the proposed test.
308. See, e.g., Atul C. Pande, Pharmacotherapyof Depressive Disorders,in SEVERE DEPRESSIVE DISORDERS,
supra note 200, at 243-67 (discussing the treatment of depression with medication); see generally DEPRESSION:
NEUROBIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL, AND THERAPEuTIc ADVANCES 365 et seq. (Adriaan Honig & Herman
M. van Praag eds., 1997).
309. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179-83 (2003) (setting the standard for involuntary medication of
defendants).
310. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 365-66 (1996) ("[I]t is unusual for even the most artful

malingerer to feign incompetence successfully for a period of time while under professional care.").
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civil commitment proceedings. 3 1 ' And while the potential for encroachment on
autonomy is real, most defendants (particularly those with viable defenses) who
truly are capable of autonomous decision-making have strong incentives to try to
prove that they have been wrongly identified as incompetent, to avoid both the
stigma of involuntary mental health treatment and the possibility of long-term
31 2
confinement with no opportunity for a determination of guilt or innocence.
Further, to the extent that some number of defendants might escape both
prosecution and confinement, that is an acceptable (if potentially painful) price to
pay.3 13 This is particularly relevant to disposition of brain-damaged defendants
who, like Jane, likely will never get better. Though it is possible that medical
experts might identify strategies to improve such defendants' competence, it is
prudent to assume that most will be adjudicatively incompetent for life. The same
result may obtain with regard to that percentage of the severely depressed whose
disease defies treatment.3 14 Should such defendants be neither dangerous nor
otherwise subject to civil commitment, they may in fact go permanently "unwhipped of justice. 31 5 But the number of such defendants is likely to be relatively
small; they will by definition not present an imminent danger to public safety; and
the ill effects of their disorders may be effectively cabined by surrogate decisionmaking, for example, by appointment of guardians to handle their financial affairs.
Though not without cost, such a result is far less offensive to the system of criminal
justice than the trial of
an incompetent person in contravention of her fundamental
3 16
constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION

This Article has proposed a thinking-and-feeling conception of the Dusky
311. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that if the defendant is not competent to stand
trial and likely will not recover the state must institute commitment proceedings or release the defendant);
Stephen Hunt, Treatment, Not TrialforMitchell, SALT LAKE TRB., Jul. 27, 2005, at Al (quoting Elizabeth Smart's
father as saying that "a long-term hospital stay for Mitchell would be a satisfactory resolution to the case as long
as the suspect is kept off the streets").
312. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492-94 (1980) (discussing the stigmatizing consequences of
psychiatric hospital confinement).
313. See Cooper, 517 U.S. at 368 n.24 (explaining that a mentally retarded individual charged with a minor
crime may not be competent and yet may not be committed); Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738 (holding that the defendant
must be released if a commitment hearing is not initiated).
314. Though modem depression treatments can be quite effective, relapse and remission rates are distressingly
high. See, e.g., Anthony S. Hale, The Treatment of Depression: The Reuptake Inhibitors, in DEPRESSION:
NEUROBIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL, AND THERAPEUTIC ADVANCES, supranote 308, at 34-38. However, if a
defendant can with treatment be rendered competent for the duration of the legal proceedings, it is of no legal
import-at least not with regard to competence-if she should later relapse. Moreover, relapses are not always at
the same level of intensity as the original episodes, and chronic depressives tend not to be those manifesting the
most extreme forms of the disease. See KAPLAN & SADOCK'S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra
note 200, at 1354. Therefore, relapse and remission rates are not good predictors of the number of defendants who
will be so disabled, so permanently, as to pose the dilemma I describe.
315. Cooper, 517 U.S. at 366-68 (quoting United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 288 (S.D. Ala. 1906)).
316. Id. at 366.
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requirement of rational understanding. To implement this conception, it is vital that
courts, examiners, and legal scholars join forensic theorists in recognizing the
centrality of decisional competence. Because most courts and examiners do not
explicitly so frame their inquiry, they deprive themselves of transparent access to
decision-making theory's large and useful trove of substantive knowledge and
analytical tools. Further, courts, examiners, and legal theorists must join the
contemporary mind sciences in recognizing that emotion is both deeply intertwined with the mechanisms of cognition and of independent significance within
rational human decision-making. Looking for and describing the specific cognitive
and affective substrates of defendants' decision-making processes provides a
language and methodology that will expose the theoretical and practical underpinnings of competence determinations.3 17
But transparency is not the only virtue. The advocated approach also will uncover
certain threats to competence that simply would not be noticed, or regarded as important,
under a more simplistic or purely cognitive approach. If, for example, we are unaware
that inability to perceive and process emotional information is highly correlated with
defective reasoning under conditions of personal risk, a defendant's deficits in the former
domain-even if proven-lack any logical hook into tests of competence. And if we lack
understanding of emotion's role in appraisal, appreciation, and choice, we not only
cannot articulate why it is that a profoundly depressed person might be incapable of
formulating and communicating a sound, stable, self-protective choice, we cannot voice
any theory under which that phenomenon might matter.Under the approach advocated
here, evidence of cognitive function never should be allowed simply to trump evidence
of emotional dysfunction; nor should the converse be true. Adjudicative competence
doctrine and practice should strive, rather, to reflect the "harmonious integration of
318
reason and passion in the brain."
This is not to say that the adjudicative competence conundrum can be solved for
once and for all by reference to the insights of the mind sciences. 31 9 Nor, despite
significant advances in our understanding of human decision-making, may we

317. Such an approach, if implemented consistently, would move the jurisprudence quite far away from the
present state of affairs, in which most examiners' reports and judicial rulings simply cite the Dusky standard,
recite apparently relevant facts, and conclude that the defendant is or is not competent. See, e.g., GRisso, supra
note 13, at 11-13.
318. LEDoux, supra note 1, at 21.
319. See Stephen J. Morse, New Neuroscience, Old Problems, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supranote 235,
at 158 (arguing that "new neuroscience... may have fewer deep normative implications for law and society than
popular imagination and even many scientists believe"). But see Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law,
Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PmL. TRANSACnON S RoYAL Soc. B: BiOLoGIcAL Sa. 1775
(2004) (arguing that neuroscience will help change the law by altering the public's perception about "free will and
responsibility"); Tancredi, supra note 254, at 90-91 ("In the future, it should be possible to determine the impact
of emotions on any one decision and to develop a method for weighing when the emotions trump an individual's
ability to make a personal rational choice.").
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320
reasonably expect to discover and define some stable conception of rationality.
Rationality will, like competence, always retain the somewhat elusive quality of an
idea. Shifting the inquiry away from a general search for "rationality," however,
and toward a more finely grained search for rational decision-making processes by
reference to both cognitive and emotional influences, is one way out of the "black
hole" into which courts sometimes feel themselves drawn. 3 2' This approach is
transparent, theoretically defensible, and amenable to concrete implementation. It
offers our best hope for giving meaning to "rational understanding."

320. See Brent Garland, Monitoring andImaging the Brain, in NEUROSCENCE AND THE LAW, supranote 235, at
11 (noting debate as to whether neuroscience can help define rationality).
321. Rumbaugh v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 395, 404 n.2 (5th Cir. 1985) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).

